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ARTICLE
Jayne R. Reardon
Alternative Business Structures: Good for the Public,
Good for the Lawyers
Abstract. There has been a shift in consumer behavior over the last several
decades. To keep up with the transforming consumer, many professions have
changed the way they do business. Yet lawyers continue to deliver services the
way they have since the founding of our country. Bar associations and legal
ethicists have long debated the idea of allowing lawyers to practice in
“alternative business structures,” where lawyers and nonlawyers can co-own
and co-manage a business to deliver legal services. This Article argues these
types of businesses inhibit lawyers’ ability to provide better legal services to the
public and that the legal profession’s resistance to change is not in the best
interest of the public or the profession.
Author. Jayne R. Reardon is the Executive Director of the Illinois Supreme
Court Commission on Professionalism and the Chair of the American Bar
Association Standing Committee on Professionalism. The viewpoints
expressed in this Article are hers personally and do not necessarily reflect the
position of any organization with which she is affiliated. The author gratefully
acknowledges the contributions of Ellyn Rosen, Deputy Director of the ABA
Center for Professional Responsibility, who reviewed a previous draft of this
Article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a paradigm shift in consumer behavior over the last
several decades. To keep up with the transforming consumer, many
professions have changed the way they do business, either by leveraging
technology or partnering with other service providers. Yet, in many respects
lawyers continue to deliver services the way they have since the founding of
our country—in law firms owned and controlled only by lawyers. Bar
associations and legal ethicists have long debated the idea of allowing
lawyers to practice in “alternative business structures,” (ABSs) where
lawyers and nonlawyers can co-own and co-manage a business to deliver
legal services.1 In all but two United States jurisdictions, lawyers cannot
1. For example, the American Bar Association’s Kutak Commission (early 1980s), the
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (1998), and the Commission on Ethics 20/20 (2009) have
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form business ventures with nonlawyers to deliver legal services.2
This Article argues these rules inhibit lawyers’ ability to provide better
legal services to the public and that the legal profession’s resistance to
change is not in the best interest of the public or the profession. Part II
discusses the history of the debate surrounding ABSs. The Article then
proposes it is time for a state supreme court to go further than the
Washington State Supreme Court3 and change its rules of professional
conduct to provide lawyers licensed in its state greater flexibility in adopting
business forms through which they deliver legal services. In conclusion, this
Article suggests a regulation reform blueprint for any state supreme court
wishing to adopt ethics rules that permit ABS.

engaged in the debate. See Candace M. Groth, Protecting the Profession Through the Pen: A Proposal for
Liberalizing ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4 to Allow Multidisciplinary Firms, 37 HAMLINE L.
REV. 565, 568, 570–73 (2014) (describing the history of Model Rule 5.4 and efforts to permit types of
multidisciplinary practices, and proposing the ABA liberalize Rule 5.4 of the Model Rules to allow
multidisciplinary firms); ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, AM. B. ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.
org/groups/professional_responsibility/aba_commission_on_ethics_20_20.html (last visited May 14,
2017) (noting the Commission on Ethics 20/20 was formed in 2009 to review the Model Rules).
2. The District of Columbia and Washington State (limited to Limited Licensed Legal
Technicians) are the two jurisdictions where these structures are allowed. See Memorandum from the
ABA Comm’n on the Future of Legal Servs. to ABA Entities, Courts, Bar Ass’ns (State, Local, Specialty
& Int’l), Law Sch., Disciplinary Agencies, Individual Clients & Client Entities (Apr. 8, 2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/office_president/alternative_business_issue
s_paper.pdf [hereinafter ABA Comm’n on the Future of Legal Servs., Issues Paper Regarding Alternative
Business Structures] (“In the United States, two jurisdictions permit forms of ABS: the District of
Columbia and Washington State.”); see also Groth, supra note 1, at 577–80, 586 (discussing the rarity of
multidisciplinary practice and alternative disciplinary structure models permitting nonlawyer
partnership and passive investment).
3. In 2012, the Washington Supreme Court created a new paraprofessional license, the Limited
License Legal Technician (LLLT), to give legal advice and practice law in a limited scope. See Paula C.
Littlewood, The Practice of Law in Transition, NWLAW, July/Aug. 2015, at 13, 13, http://nwlawyer.
wsba.org/nwlawyer/july-august_2015?pg=15#pg15 (describing the new LLLT license as “the first
independent legal paraprofessional in the United States that is licensed to give legal advice,” and
informing the Washington “Supreme Court stepped in and created the LLLT license”). In 2015, the
Washington Supreme Court issued a new rule allowing LLLTs to own a minority interest in law firms.
In re Expedited Adoption of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Order No. 25700-A1096 (Wash. Sup. Ct. Mar. 23, 2015), http://op.bna.com.s3.amazonaws.com/mopc.nsf/r%3FOpen%
3djros-9vcl5h (promulgating a new Rule of Professional Conduct in Washington allowing a business
structure between an LLLT and a lawyer where “a lawyer and an LLLT may practice in a jointly owned
firm or other business structure” as long as the “LLLTs do not possess a majority ownership interest,”
do not have “direct supervisory authority over any lawyer,” do not regulate or direct any attorney’s
“professional judgment in rendering legal services,” and the firm’s attorneys with managerial authority
“expressly undertake responsibility for the conduct of LLLT partners or owners to the same extent
they are responsible for the conduct of lawyers in the firm”).
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II. THE CURRENT ETHICAL FRAMEWORK
United States lawyers are regulated by the highest court in the jurisdiction
from which they received a license to practice.4 Each state supreme court
adopts rules of professional conduct applicable to those lawyers, and most
states’ rules closely follow the American Bar Association Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (the Model Rules).5 The current rules prescribing the
acceptable business structures were put in place at a different time and under
different circumstances. They must be re-examined with a critical eye.
A. What Are Alternative Business Structures for Lawyers?
In most United States jurisdictions, lawyers are only allowed to practice
in three business formats: sole proprietorships, partnerships, or limited
liability companies (LLCs).6 These models are allowed because they are not
prohibited by a jurisdiction’s version of the American Bar Association’s
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4.7 Generally, Model Rule 5.4,
entitled “Professional Independence of a Lawyer,” prohibits a lawyer or law
firm from sharing fees with a nonlawyer except under certain circumstances
and from “form[ing] a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the
partnership’s activities “consist of the practice of law.”8 Rule 5.4(d)
prohibits a lawyer from practicing law in a corporation or organization that
4. See Memorandum from Jamie S. Gorelick & Michael Traynor, Co-Chairs, ABA Comm’n on
Ethics 20/20, to ABA Entities, Courts, Bar Ass’ns (State, Local, Specialty & Int’l), Law Sch., &
Individuals (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_
2020/20111202-ethics2020-discussion_draft-alps.authcheckdam.pdf (explaining the highest appellate
court within each United States jurisdiction “possesses the inherent or constitutional authority to
regulate the legal profession); see also Lawyer Regulation for a New Century: Report of the Commission on
Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, AM. B. ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_
responsibility/resources/report_archive/mckay_report.html#3 (last visited May 14, 2017) (“Today,
judicial regulation of lawyers is a principle firmly established in every state.”).
5. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct, AM. B. ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct.html (last visited
May 14, 2017) (announcing each state implements their version of the Model Rules but “California is
the only state that does not have professional conduct rules that follow the format of the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct”).
6. See generally Edward S. Adams, Rethinking the Law Firm Organizational Form and Capitalization
Structure, 78 MO. L. REV. 777, 778–84 (2013) (discussing the evolvement of permissible business
models state statutes provide attorneys).
7. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2012) (prohibiting a lawyer
from (1) “shar[ing] legal fees with a nonlawyer” absent enumerated exceptions; (2) “form[ing] a
partnership with a nonlawyer if” the partnership’s activities could be viewed as the practice of law;
(3) allowing another who compensates, hires, or recommends the lawyer to direct the professional
judgment of the lawyer; and (4) practicing law in for-profit corporations that allow nonlawyer
ownership, nonlawyer directorship, or for a nonlawyer’s control of the lawyer’s professional judgment).
8. Id. r. 5.4(a) & (b).
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seeks to make a profit if a nonlawyer is a director or officer, can control the
attorney’s professional judgment, or has an ownership interest in the
enterprise.9
In this Article, ABSs refer to any of the following: (1) a business structure
allowing nonlawyers to have a larger percentage of ownership or managerial
interest; (2) a business structure permitting passive investment in the ABS;
or (3) a business structure allowing nonlegal as well as legal services
(sometimes referred to as multidisciplinary practices or MDPs). Except in
a limited manner prescribed in two jurisdictions,10 all of these structures
would run afoul of the current rules of professional conduct in effect in the
United States that prohibit fee sharing with nonlawyers (Rule 5.4(a)–(b))11
and the unauthorized practice of law (Rule 5.5).12
B. Brief History and Rationale of Model Rule 5.4
As noted above, most states hew closely to the Model Rules. For that
reason, although the American Bar Association (ABA) is a voluntary
professional association with no official regulatory authority,13 its Model
Rules are incredibly influential.14
The ABA rules have contained a prohibition against lawyers sharing fees
with nonlawyers since 1928,15 which can be further traced back to both
court decisions and legislation16 emerging in the prior two decades
9. Id. r. 5.4(d).
10. See Adams, supra note 6, at 797 (“[N]ot all jurisdictions agree [with the prohibition]. The
District of Colombia permits partnerships and fee sharing among lawyers and non[]lawyers as long as
the entity provides solely legal services.” (citing D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4 (2007))).
11. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(a) & (b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2012) (prohibiting
lawyers and nonlawyers from splitting fees derived from the provision of legal services and from
forming partnerships together if the partnership engages in the practice of law).
12. See id. r. 5.5 (outlining the rules for the unauthorized practice of law and practice in more than
one jurisdiction).
13. One exception is the regulatory authority that the ABA has in the bar admissions context.
See Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar About Us, AM. B. ASS’N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/about_us.html (last visited May 14, 2016)
(“[The Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar] provide[s] leadership and services to
those involved in legal education and admissions to the bar.”).
14. See Nathan M. Crystal, The Incompleteness of the Model Rules and the Development of Professional
Standards, 52 MERCER L. REV. 839, 854 (2001) (“The fundamental source of lawyers’ professional
obligations are the rules of professional conduct adopted by courts in each jurisdiction. In the vast
majority of jurisdictions, these rules are based on the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct.”).
15. See CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS canon 34 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1928) (promulgating the
prohibition on dividing legal fees with nonlawyers).
16. By 1935, almost half of the states had passed legislation prohibiting corporations from
employing lawyers to provide third parties with legal services and subsequently supply the fees to the
corporation. See Roy D. Simon, Jr., Fee Sharing Between Lawyers and Public Interest Groups, 98 YALE L.J
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prohibiting corporations from practicing law in the United States.17 The
fee-sharing prohibition was extended to all nonlawyers in the 1928 formal
compilation of ethical rules for lawyers by the ABA.18 Canon 34 provided
“[n]o division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer,
based upon a division of service or responsibility.”19 The rationale has been
described as a way to stop large banks from “grab[bing] off all the legal
business in the community” and to prevent personal injury attorneys from
paying networks of ambulance chasers, both of which were major issues of
the day.20
The ethical rules were reformulated in 1969 when the ABA adopted the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility (the Model Code).21 The Model
Code was organized by Canons containing a general proposition followed
by ethical considerations (ECs) and disciplinary rules (DRs).22 ECs were
designed to be an aspirational guide to conduct, while a violation of DRs
would subject an attorney to sanction.23
1069, 1078–79 (1989) (discussing the history of fee sharing with nonlawyers). See generally Laurel A.
Rigertas, Lobbying and Litigating Against “Legal Bootleggers”—the Role of the Organized Bar in the Expansion of
the Courts’ Inherent Powers in the Early Twentieth Century, 46 CAL. WEST L. REV. 65 (2009) (contrasting the
regulatory actions of the legislative and the judicial branches in the early twentieth century).
17. See Simon, supra note 16, at 1078–79 (explaining the development and current state of the
prohibition against the sharing of legal fees with nonattorneys); see also In re Co-Operative Law Co.,
92 N.E. 15, 16–17 (N.Y. 1910) (holding a corporation that provided legal services through staff
attorneys since 1901 was incapable of lawfully engaging in the practice of law, and reasoning lawyers
working for a corporation would be beholden to the corporation rather than the client). In 1925, the
holding of In re Co-Operative Law was applied to the sharing of fees with non-profit organizations. See
ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 8 (1925), reprinted in AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES 71
(1957) (noting ABA opposition to fee sharing with non-profit organizations).
18. See CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS canon 34 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1928) (limiting fee sharing to that
done between attorneys when it is “based upon a division of service or responsibility”).
19. Id.
20. Simon, supra note 16, at 1080 & nn. 48–49 (citations omitted).
21. See W. William Hodes, The Code of Professional Responsibility, The Kutak Rules, and the Trial Lawyer’s
Code: Surprisingly, Three Peas in a Pod, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 739, 744 (1981) (reporting that in 1981, at
the time the article was published, the current Code of Professional Responsibility was the one adopted
in 1969); see also Model Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 5 (explaining the 1969 Model Code of
Professional Responsibility replaced the 1908 Canons and preceded the Model Rules).
22. F. LaMar Forshee, Professional Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 689,
692 (1978) (listing the three components of the 1969 code as: (1) the admonitory Canons; (2) the
precatory Ethical Considerations; and (3) the mandatory Disciplinary Rules).
23. The Model Code explained the ECs and DRs as follows:
The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward
which every member of the profession should strive. They constitute a body of principles upon
which the lawyer can rely for guidance in many specific situations.
The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are mandatory in character. The
Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without
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Three rules germane to this discussion were organized together under
Canon 3, entitled “A Lawyer Should Assist In Preventing the Unauthorized
Practice of Law.”24 Under these three disciplinary code provisions, a lawyer
or law firm should not: (1) “aid a non[]lawyer in the unauthorized practice
of law” or practice in a jurisdiction where such practice would violate that
jurisdiction’s professional regulations; (2) “share legal fees with a
non[]lawyer, except” in certain circumstances; and (3) “form a partnership
with a non[]lawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the
practice of law.”25
In 1983, the rules were again reformulated and renamed from the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.26 Under the Model Rules, the language of DR 3-101 of the Model
Code was incorporated into Model Rule 5.5(a),27 and the language of DR 3102 and DR 3-103 was incorporated into Rule 5.4(a)–(b).28

being subject to disciplinary action. . . . The Model Code makes no attempt to prescribe either
disciplinary procedures or penalties for violation of a Disciplinary Rule, nor does it undertake to
define standards for civil liability of lawyers for professional conduct. The severity of judgment
against one found guilty of violating a Disciplinary Rule should be determined by the character
of the offense and the attendant circumstances.
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (footnotes
removed).
24. Id. canon 3.
25. Id. DR 3–101–03 (footnote removed).
26. Model Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 5 (acknowledging the Model Rule’s 1983 adoption
followed the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics and 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility).
27. Compare MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 3–101 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980)
(prohibiting lawyers from assisting “a non[]lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law,” as well as
“practice[ing] law in a jurisdiction where to do so would be in violation of regulations of the profession
in that jurisdiction”), with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.5(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (“A
lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in
that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so.”).
28. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4 is titled “Professional Independence of a Lawyer,”
and the portion of the rule adopting DRs 3-102 and 3-103 provides:
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:
(1) [death benefits may be paid to a deceased] lawyer’s estate or to one or more specified persons;
(2) a lawyer [may] purchase[] the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared lawyer [and]
may[] . . . pay to the estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon the purchase
price;
(3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan,
even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement; and
(4) a lawyer may share court-awarded legal fees with a nonprofit organization that employed,
retained[,] or recommended employment of the lawyer in the matter.
(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the
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The ethical considerations animating Canon 3 had a different focus from
the language included in the current Comments to Model Rules 5.4 and 5.5
(Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law).29
Canon 3’s ECs stated that “[t]he purpose of the legal profession is to make
educated legal representation available to the public” and that the rationale
for “[t]he prohibition against the practice of law by a layman” was the need
for the public to be able to rely upon the “integrity and competence of those
who undertake to render legal services.”30
partnership consist of the practice of law.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(a)–(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). The rule added
subsection (4), which did not appear in DRs 3-102 and 3-103. Id.; see also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 3–101 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (providing the same provisions as rule 5.4(a)–(b),
but remaining silent on fee sharing with nonprofit organizations). The remainder of Model Rule 5.4
provides:
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render
legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer’s professional judgment in rendering
such legal services.
(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or association
authorized to practice law for a profit, if:
(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the estate of a
lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;
(2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof or occupies the position of similar
responsibility in any form of association other than a corporation[]; or
(3) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(c)–(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
29. In a conundrum that has plagued drafters of the ethical rules, the Code included no definition
of the “practice of law” because it was “neither necessary nor desirable to attempt the formulation of
a single, specific definition.” MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-5 (AM. BAR ASS’N
1980). The challenge in defining the “practice of law” has only grown more acute and tautological
over the years. Most states’ Unauthorized Practice of Law (UPL) provisions make no distinction
between ordinary legal work performed by attorneys licensed in another jurisdiction and advice given
by people who have no legal training at all. TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE
PRACTICE OF LAW, REPORT 9–10 (2003), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
cpr/model-def/taskforce_rpt_803.authcheckdam.pdf. Several commissions of the ABA, most notably
the ABA Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law, attempted to define the term.
Id. at 3. In August 2003, this Task Force came up with a general framework but ultimately
recommended each state should develop its own definition of what constitutes the practice of law. See
id. (“The Task Force . . . became convinced that the necessary balancing test for determining who
should be permitted to provide services that are included within the definition of the practice of law is
best done at the state level.”). The rationale was that each state has a unique legal culture and history
“with nonlawyer activity and an economic, political[] and social environment that will affect its
judgment about the types and amount of nonlawyer activity likely to enhance access to justice and
protect the public.” Id. at 3 n.6 (citation omitted). Although UPL is closely related to ABSs and current
Rule 5.4, a discussion of the interrelation is not possible in the space constraints of this Article.
30. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-1, 3-7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
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Thus, the rationale animating Rule 5.4 and its predecessor rules against
fee sharing between lawyers and nonlawyers includes elements of
protectionism as well as concerns about client loyalty and that legal services
provided to the public are competent and honest.
C. United States Jurisdictions Have Adopted Modified Versions of Model Rule 5.4
Currently, two United States jurisdictions have adopted a modified
Rule 5.4 to allow lawyers to practice together with nonlawyers: Washington
State and the District of Columbia.31
This change in Washington State applies to joint efforts between lawyers
and only one other type of nonlawyer, a new paraprofessional created by the
Supreme Court of Washington in 2012.32 In Washington State, Limited
License Legal Technicians (LLLTs) may provide certain legal services in
specified substantive areas.33 In 2015, the Washington Supreme Court
issued a new court rule allowing that state’s LLLTs to form a minority
partnership interest with lawyers in rendering legal services.34
Rule 5.9 of the new Washington Rules of Professional Conduct, titled
“Business Structures Involving LLLT and Lawyer Ownership,” provides:
(a) . . . [A] lawyer may;
(1) share fees with an LLLT who is in the same firm as the lawyer;
(2) form a partnership with an LLLT where the activities of the partnership
consist of the practice of law; or
(3) practice with or in the form of a professional corporation, association,
or other business structure authorized to practice law for a profit in which an
LLLT owns an interest or serves as a corporate director or officer or occupies
a position of similar responsibility.”35

31. See Groth, supra note 1, at 580, 585–87 (discussing multidisciplinary practice and alternative
disciplinary structure models that permit nonlawyer partnership and passive investment); see also
Littlewood, supra note 3, at 13 (recognizing the promulgation of the Washington rule).
32. See Brooks Holland, The LLLT Program in Washington State Progresses with a Comprehensive RPC
Proposal, SALT (Nov. 15, 2014), https://www.saltlaw.org/the-lllt-program-in-washington-stateprogresses-with-a-comprehensive-rpc-proposal/ (acknowledging the 2012 invention of the LLLT
license, which “effectively initiated a new legal profession,” and discussing the then-proposed Rule 5.9,
which would permit LLLTs and lawyers “to partner with each other”); see also Littlewood, supra note 3,
at 13 (noting Washington created the LLLT license in 2012 thereby giving rise to “the first independent
legal paraprofessional in the United States”).
33. See generally Andrew M. Perlman, Towards the Law of Legal Services, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 49,
108, 110–11 (2015) (enumerating the permissible scope of LLLT participation, and describing the
utility of providing these limitations).
34. WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.9 (2015).
35. Id. r. 5.9(a). Subsection (b) of rule 5.9 goes on to condition joint ownership upon the
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Over twenty-five years ago, the District of Columbia adopted a version
of Model Rule 5.4 that allowed lawyers to form a partnership with
nonlawyers for the rendering of legal services.36 The limitations only allow
this type of organization if: (1) its sole purpose is providing clients with legal
services; (2) all people with managerial authority or a financial interest must
abide by the District of Columbia Bar’s Rules of Professional Conduct;
(3) lawyers with managerial authority or a financial interest must be
responsible for the conformity of all nonlawyers with the Rules of
Professional Conduct as required of lawyers in Rule 5.1; and (4) all the

following:
(1) LLLTs [may] not direct or regulate any lawyer’s professional judgment in rendering legal
services;
(2) LLLTs [may not] have . . . direct supervisory authority over any lawyer;
(3) LLLTs [may] not possess a majority ownership interest or exercise controlling managerial
authority in the firm; and
(4) lawyers with managerial authority in the firm [must] expressly undertake responsibility for
the conduct of LLLT partners or owners to the same extent they are responsible for the conduct
of lawyers in the firm under Rule 5.1.
Id. r. 5.9(b).
36. See Susan Gilbert & Larry Lempert, The Nonlawyer Partner: Moderate Proposals Deserve a Chance,
2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 383, 410 (1988) (classifying the version of Rule 5.4 then-under consideration
as “a reasonable intermediate alternative”); see also 5.4:101 Model Rule Comparison, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/dc/narr/DC_NARR_5.HTM#5.4:100 (last visited May 14,
2017) (indicating paragraph (b) of the District of Columbia’s Rule 5.4 has permitted attorneys to
practice in organizations with nonlawyer owners or managers since “the beginning” and subject to
specified conditions). The District of Columbia Rule provides, in part:
(b) A lawyer may practice law in a partnership or other form of organization in which a
financial interest is held or managerial authority is exercised by an individual nonlawyer who
performs professional services which assist the organization in providing legal services to clients,
but only if:
(1) The partnership or organization has as its sole purpose providing legal services to
clients;
(2) All persons having such managerial authority or holding a financial interest undertake
to abide by these Rules of Professional Conduct;
(3) The lawyers who have a financial interest or managerial authority in the partnership or
organization undertake to be responsible for the nonlawyer participants to the same extent as if
nonlawyer participants were lawyers under Rule 5.1;
(4) The foregoing conditions are set forth in writing.
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render
legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer’s professional judgment in rendering
such legal services.
D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(b)–(c) (D.C. BAR ASS’N 2015).
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preceding conditions are in writing.37
Although the District of Columbia has allowed ABSs for many decades,
few ABS firms have organized there.38 Writers postulate that the reasons
include a concern by lawyers licensed in the District of Columbia who are
also licensed in other jurisdictions that they might run afoul of ethical rules
in other jurisdictions that do not allow fee splitting or nonlawyer
ownership.39
D. The ABA’s Attempts to Modify Model Rule 5.4 Have Been Met With Stiff
Resistance.
Over the decades, the ABA, through various commissions, has made
numerous attempts to modify the anti-fee-sharing rule. Such efforts have
been soundly rejected by the House of Delegates, the governing body of the
organization.
In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the Kutak Commission
reformulated the Model Code of Professional Responsibility into the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, subsequently adopted by the ABA House of
Delegates in 1983.40 The Kutak Commission’s initial proposed draft of
Model Rule 5.4 would have permitted multidisciplinary practices,41 but the
37. See id. r. 5.4(b) (promulgating the limitations for a partnership between lawyers and
nonlawyers in Washington D.C.). For an in depth discussion on the District of Columbia’s rule, set
forth in the comments to the rule, see Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 5.4—Professional Independence of a
Lawyer, DCBAR, https://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/legal-ethics/amended-rules/rule5-04.cfm
(last visited May 14, 2017).
38. See Groth, supra note 1, at 586 (claiming few District of Columbia firms have converted to
nonlawyer partnership due to the unknown liabilities inherent in transitioning if the firm practices
outside of the District of Columbia).
39. See ABA Comm’n on the Future of Legal Servs., Issues Paper Regarding Alternative Business
Structures, supra note 2 (acknowledging attorneys licensed in both the District of Columbia and another
jurisdiction might fear that participation in a District of Columbia ABS would violate the other
jurisdiction’s ethical rules by which they are also bound); see also Gorelick & Traynor, supra note 4
(attributing the fear to many multijurisdictional District of Columbia firms that would add nonlawyer
partners if not for other jurisdictions’ prohibition on such ownership).
40. See The Kutak Commission, KUTAK ROCK LLP, http://www.kutakrock.com/kutakcommission/ (last visited May 14, 2017) (“In 1977, a commission of the American Bar Association was
created and tasked with an initial review, and eventually a complete restatement, of the then[-]existing
Code of Responsibility . . . [wherein o]ver a six-year period . . . the Commission produced innumerable
drafts of various parts of what became the overall proposal.”).
41. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N, Proposed Final Draft, 1981),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/kutak_5
-81.authcheckdam.pdf (stating a lawyer may work for an organization where the “financial interest is
held or managerial authority is exercised by a nonlawyer[] or by a lawyer acting in a capacity other than
that of representing clients”). Multidisciplinary practices (MDPs) is a term referring to entities that
provide legal and other professional services. See Report to the House of Delegates Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice, AM. B. ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_
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ABA House of Delegates rejected the idea.42 Although a variety of reasons
were put forth, “concerns about competitive threats to the profession
loomed large.”43 This fear was created due to the concerns about
nonlawyers, also called the “fear of Sears.”44
In 1999, the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (the MDP
Commission) proposed that lawyers and other professionals should be
allowed to share fees as part of a practice that delivers both legal and
nonlegal services.45 The ABA House of Delegates rejected the idea,
concluding it should not be pursued again “until additional study
demonstrates that such changes will further the public interest without
sacrificing or compromising lawyer independence and the legal profession’s
tradition of loyalty to clients.”46 The MDP Commission conducted
additional research and prepared a revised recommendation that the House
again resoundingly rejected, going on to adopt a resolution stating that
multidisciplinary practices were inconsistent with the profession’s “core
values.”47
In 2009, the ABA established the Commission on Ethics 20/20 (the
20/20 Commission) to consider amendments to the Model Rules in light of
technology and globalization.48 In 2012, the 20/20 Commission stated “it

responsibility/commission_multidisciplinary_practice/mdpfinalrep2000.html (last visited May 14,
2017) (defining multidisciplinary practice).
42. See id. (summarizing how, in 1999, the ABA House of Delegates refused to make any changes
to Model Rule 5.4 to allow “a lawyer to offer legal services through a multidisciplinary practice”).
43. Perlman, supra note 33, at 75 (citing Laurel S. Terry, A Primer on MDPs: Should the “No” Rule
Become a New Rule?, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 869, 876–77 (1999)). “For example, during the House debate a
member asked whether the proposal would have allowed Sears Roebuck to open a law office in each
of its stores” and once Professor Geoffrey Hazard, the Commission’s reporter, “answered ‘yes,’ . . . the
proposal was promptly defeated.” See id. (citing JAMES E. MOLITERNO, THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROFESSION IN CRISIS: RESISTANCE AND RESPONSES TO CHANGE 165–66 (2013)). For a discussion
on the evolution of legal services regulation and a proposal of a regulatory framework that includes
those who provide law-related assistance but do not have a juris doctor degree, see generally id.
44. See JAMES E. MOLITERNO, THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN CRISIS: RESISTANCE
AND RESPONSES TO CHANGE 165–66 (2013) (explaining the phrase originated from the fear Sears had
created in the marketplace); see also Perlman, supra note 33, at 76 & n.147 (stressing now the fear is likely
to be of powerhouses such as Walmart or Sam’s Club (citations omitted)).
45. See Laurel S. Terry, The Work of the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, in STEPHEN J.
MCGARRY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICES AND PARTNERSHIPS: LAWYERS, CONSULTANTS AND
CLIENTS 2-1, § 2.04, at 2-13 (2002), http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/l/s/lst3/McGarry%
20Mutlidisciplinary%20Ch2.PDF (detailing the Commission’s recommendations).
46. Id. at § 2.02, at 2-4.
47. Id. at § 2.02, at 2-5 to -6. For a discussion on the focus of the 20/20 Commission’s second
recommendation and ultimate rejection, see id. at 2.04, at 2-18.
48. Perlman, supra note 33, at 58 (“The ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 undertook the most
recent law of lawyering reform effort in the United States. . . [by] studying how the ABA Model Rules
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would not propose changes to ABA existing policy prohibiting non[]lawyer
ownership of law firms, but it also announced at that time that it would
continue its effort to find a way to permit fee splitting between lawyers and
non[]lawyers.”49 Thus, in 2012, the Illinois State Bar Association (ISBA)
responded to the 20/20 Commission’s study of nonlawyer investments and
ownership of law firms (referred to as Alternative Law Practice Structures)
by way of a resolution.50 Reaffirming its previously-stated ABA policy, the
ISBA held the position that the sharing of legal fees with nonlawyers, and
any ownership by nonlawyers of a law practice or business that delivers legal
services, is “inconsistent with the core values of the legal profession.”51
Several state bar associations joined in support of the ISBA, but the
Resolution was not adopted.52 However, the ISBA’s efforts had some
success.53 The 20/20 Commission subsequently indicated “it had or would
drop all of its proposals pertaining to non[]lawyer ownership of law firms
or fee splitting between lawyers and non[]lawyers.”54
The ABA’s Commission on Future of Legal Services (the Future Legal
Services Commission), in existence from 2014 through 2016,55 took
of Professional Conduct should be updated to address increasing globalization and changes in
technology.” (citation omitted)).
49. Richard L. Thies, Sharing Fees, Ownership of Law Firms with Non-Lawyers, SENIOR LAW.,
Feb. 2013, at 8, 8, https://www.isba.org/sites/default/files/sections/seniorlawyers/newsletter/
Senior%20Lawyers%20February%202013.pdf.
50. See generally JOHN G. LOCALLO, ILL. STATE BAR ASS’N, & EDWARD J. SCHOENBAUM, SENIOR
LAWYERS DIV. OF THE AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2012),
http://iln.isba.org/sites/default/files/blog/2012/08/isba-raises-issue-nonlawyer-ownership-lawfirms-aba-house-delegates/joint_isba_sr_lawyers_div_resolution%20authcheckdam.pdf (responding
to any amendments that could be recommended by the 20/20 Commission, and urging the ABA to
reaffirm its 2000 policy against lawyers sharing fees with nonlawyers and nonlawyer control or
ownership of law practices).
51. See id. at 10 (proposing the ABA reaffirm principles stated in a 2000 ABA House of Delegates
Resolution, which prohibits lawyers from sharing legal fees with nonlawyers, rather than revise that
Resolution).
52. See Thies, supra note 49, at 8 (announcing the indefinite postponement of the Resolution after
a House of Delegates floor debate where ISBA and other state bar associations spoke against revisions).
53. See id. (noting that although ISBA’s Resolution was postponed indefinitely, the debate made
it clear “that changes in ethical standards to permit non[]lawyer ownership of law firms or fee splitting
with non[]lawyers would be defeated if finally proposed by the Commission”).
54. Id.
55. See Commission on the Future of Legal Services, AM. B. ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.
org/groups/centers_commissions/commission-on-the-future-of-legal-services.html (last visited
May 14, 2017) (indicating the Future Legal Services Commission’s report took into consideration
suggestions and ideas it received from 2014 until 2016); see also Robert Ambrogi, This Week in Legal
Tech: ABA Future Panel Calls for Broad Changes in Legal Services, ABOVE L. (Aug. 8, 2016, 11:50 AM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2016/08/this-week-in-legal-tech-aba-future-panel-calls-for-broad-changesin-legal-services/ (acknowledging the Future Legal Services Commission issued its “final report” after
a two-year study period).
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another run at ABSs but fell short of making a recommendation to the
The Future Legal Services Commission
House of Delegates.56
disseminated an issues paper on ABS57 that drew comments that are posted
on the ABA’s website.58 Most are from traditional bar and other legal
organizations voicing opposition to the idea.59
III. CURRENT PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK
Despite the constancy of lawyer regulation prohibiting, except in
delineated instances, fee sharing with nonlawyers,60 the landscape in which
lawyers practice has changed and continues to change at an exponential
rate.61 A major driver of change is technology.62
Before the advent of the Internet, legal information was the exclusive
56. The only proposal of the Future Legal Services Commission presented to the House of
Delegates was a resolution and report on regulatory objectives. JUDY PERRY MARTINEZ, COMM’N ON
THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERV., & ANDREW PERLMAN, COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERV.,
PROPOSED RESOLUTION AND REPORT (2016), https://www.americanbar.org/news/reporter_
resources/midyear-meeting-2016/house-of-delegates-resolutions/105.html
(follow
“Proposed
resolution and report” hyperlink). The House of Delegates adopted the model regulatory objectives
with a condition “that nothing contained in this Resolution abrogates in any manner existing ABA
policy prohibiting non[]lawyer ownership of law firms or the core values adopted by the House of
Delegates . . . on July 11, 2000.” HOUSE OF DELEGATES RESOLUTION 105 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016)
(adopted as revised & amended), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/
2016mymres/105.pdf.
57. See generally ABA Comm’n on the Future of Legal Servs., Issues Paper Regarding Alternative
Business Structures, supra note 2 (describing recent developments that have occurred since “[t]he ABA
Commission on Ethics 20/20 conducted the last ABA review on” ABSs, and requesting feedback and
information pertaining to ABSs to develop a recommendation).
58. See Comments - Alternative Business Structures Issues Paper, AM. B. ASS’N, https://www.
americanbar.org/groups/centers_commissions/commission-on-the-future-of-legal-services/
Comments4.html (last visited May 14, 2017) (displaying links to comments, delineated by the issuing
entities, received in response to the Alternative Business Structures Issue Paper).
59. See id. (listing comments from ABA entities and from outside entities, such as LegalZoom,
law firms, and state bar associations from New Jersey, New York, and Texas).
60. See Simon, supra note 16, 1076–77 (tracing the prohibition’s English roots back to 1729 and
the early 1800’s).
61. See Adams, supra note 6, at 806 (acknowledging legal practice “has become increasingly global,
growing exponentially since the mid-1980s” (citing James R. Faulconbridge et al., Global Law Firms:
Globalization and Organizational Spaces of Cross-Border Legal Work, 28 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 455, 465
(2008))); Groth, supra note 1, at 602 (“Given the momentum of the rapidly changing legal market and
the growth of legal services providers, it is only a matter of time before the ABA is forced to confront
the issue of multidisciplinary practices.” (citations omitted)); Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the
Delivery of Legal Services, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 3 (2012) (arguing for “an entirely new framework for the
delivery of legal service,” which is necessary due to “[o]ur commercialized, technology-driven, and
increasingly global society”).
62. See Perlman, supra note 33, at 67 (recognizing the change in times and transformation of the
legal market due to technology and globalization fueling lawyer mobility and cross-border practice
(citation omitted)).
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province of lawyers and legally-trained individuals.63 Lawyers, historically,
have been able to both access the legal information and give legal advice—
often at the same hourly rate.64 Those without legal training had difficulty
accessing the arcane organization of legal reference materials. And if they
could access the information, they had an equally daunting task of
understanding it.65
However, lawyers and the legally trained no longer have a monopoly on
legal information.66
Legal information is readily available and
understandable to anyone with access to the Internet.67
Against this backdrop, let’s consider how those who deliver and consume
legal services are faring under the current business models for lawyers.
A. The Current Model Is Not Working Well for Consumers.
1. Individual Customers
There is a dearth of information about the satisfaction level of individuals
who actually receive lawyers’ services in the United States.68 A quick
Internet search reveals a multitude of tools to measure customer satisfaction
in various contexts. However, the only actual reports of surveys conducted
of customers who have consumed legal services appear to be from the
United Kingdom.69
63. See Thomas R. Bruce, Some Thoughts on the Constitution of Public Legal Information Providers,
CORNELL UNIV. SCH. L., https://www.law.cornell.edu/working-papers/open/bruce/warwick.html
(last visited May 14, 2017) (“[O]ur definition of ‘public access’ to law has implicitly but dramatically
changed. We must now imagine an expanded public seeking smaller and more relevant granules of
information[] and seeking it via the Internet.”).
64. See Groth, supra note 1, at 566 (describing the provision of legal and law-related services as
being performed solely by attorneys in the past (citing John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni,
Multidisciplinary Practice and the American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal
Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 110–12 (2000))).
65. See Deborah L. Rhode, What We Know and Need to Know About the Delivery of Legal Services by
Non-Lawyers, 67 S.C. L. REV. 429, 430 (2016) (reporting that unrepresented parties are frequently
confronted with forms with archaic jargon and “procedures of excessive and bewildering complexity”).
66. See Perlman, supra note 33, at 99 (“The number of people who are not lawyers and are already
involved in the delivery of legal or law-related services is growing rapidly.”).
67. See Bilal Kaiser, 10 Years of New Technology and How Our Lives Have Changed, LEGALZOOM,
https://www.legalzoom.com/articles/10-years-of-new-technology-and-how-our-lives-have-changed
(last visited May 14, 2017) (“What was once pretty much impossible, simple and common legal matters
can now be completed online. Creating last wills and living trusts, protecting intellectual property[,]
and even forming a business no longer require going through an expensive attorney’s office.”).
68. See Rhode, supra note 65, at 434 (indicating the public is rarely asked for its opinion).
69. See, e.g., RES. WORKS LTD., CMA LEGAL SERVICES: QUALITATIVE RESEARCH REPORT 52
(2016),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/577f634eed915d3cfd000123/ResearchWorks-Legal-Services-Report.pdf (reporting on the satisfaction of people in the United Kingdom
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In sharp contrast, a multitude of studies document an increasing segment
of the population, primarily low- and moderate-income Americans, are not
accessing legal services.70 Deborah Rhode notes from her research that,
“[a]ccording to most estimates, about four-fifths of the civil legal needs of
the poor, and two- to three-fifths of the needs of middle-income individuals,
remain unmet.”71 Gillian Hadfield has found that the provision of legal
services in comparison to the unmet legal need is “startlingly low.”72
The public’s access to justice continues to worsen in the United States as
shown by the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index.73 The 2016 Index
ranks the United States eighteenth out of the 113 countries surveyed.74
However, the ranking—with respect to providing civil legal services—is far
from laudable.75 On the metric of “the accessibility and affordability of
civil courts, including whether people are aware of available remedies, can
access and afford legal advice and representation, and can access the court
system without incurring unreasonable fees, encountering unreasonable
procedural hurdles, or experiencing physical or linguistic barriers,”76 the
United States ranked ninety-fourth out of 113 countries.77 Therefore, on
this metric, the United States dropped an embarrassing near thirty spots
regarding the quality of legal services providers).
70. See, e.g., REBECCA SANDEFUR, ACCESSING JUSTICE IN THE CONTEMPORARY USA:
FINDINGS FROM THE COMMUNITY NEEDS AND SERVICES STUDY (2014), http://www.
americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/sandefur_accessing_justice_in_the_contempo
rary_usa._aug._2014.pdf (“A majority of respondents to the CNSS believe that lawyers’ fees are out of
reach for poor people: 58% of those surveyed agreed with the statement that ‘lawyers are not affordable
for people on low incomes.’”).
71. DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3 (2004). When subsequently writing on this in
2016, Deborah Rhode indicated that “over four-fifths” of the poor’s legal needs are unaddressed and
“a majority” of middle-income Americans needs are unmet. Rhode, supra note 65, at 429 (citations
omitted).
72. Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative Assessment of the Legal Resource
Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129, 146 (2010).
73. See WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 2016 20–21 (2016),
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/RoLI_Final-Digital_0.pdf (illustrating
the grave difference in 113 reporting countries’ “adherence to the rule of law,” and ranking the United
States eighteen).
74. Id. at 21.
75. See id. at 40–41 (providing the United States ranks twenty-eighth out of the 113 countries
considered for civil justice).
76. Id. at 166. The Index ranks countries based on several factors comprising the public’s access
to legal services and the countries’ “adherence to the rule of law.” See generally id. at 9–17 (detailing the
methodology of the Index).
77. U.S. Rank on Access to Civil Justice in Rule of Law Index Drops to 94th out of 113 Countries, NCCRC
(Oct. 27, 2016), http://civilrighttocounsel.org/major_developments/217.
For an interactive
compilation of data pertaining to the United States’ 2016 results, see United States, WORLD JUST.
PROJECT, http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/#/groups/USA (last visited May 14, 2017).
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between 2015 and 2016, continuing a multi-year slide.78
Despite facing frequent and serious civil justice issues, such as housing,
family matters, and access to health care, most low- and middle-income
people do not turn to lawyers or the legal system for help.79 Cost is cited
as a significant impediment to people reaching out to lawyers.80 Millions in
need of representation cannot afford to hire a lawyer.81 But cost is not the
only impediment.82
According to a 2013 study, 46% of respondents who had experienced a
civil legal issue saw no need for third-party assistance, 24% believed
assistance would not help, 17% said it would cost too much, and 9% did not
know where to seek help.83 Their most common responses were to either
do nothing or to seek self-help.84
A large percentage of the population seems to be deliberately avoiding
contact with lawyers even as they avail themselves of nontraditional legal
services.85 Some people seem empowered (perhaps by the availability of
resources on the Internet) to do it themselves—DIY is a growing

78. U.S. Rank on Access to Civil Justice in Rule of Law Index Drops to 94th out of 113 Countries, supra
note 77 (indicating the United States’ slide in rank “has occurred over the past three years”).
79. See Knake, supra note 61, at 2, 4 (reasoning unmet legal needs result from unaffordability and
because individuals do not have information about their legal needs, such as when they need to hire an
attorney or how to find one); Rhode, supra note 65, at 429–30 (stating the majority of the legal needs
of low- and middle-income Americans are unmet, and that courts handling small claims, bankruptcy,
housing, and family members demonstrate that “parties without attorneys are often now the rule rather
than the exception”).
80. See Perlman, supra note 33, at 93 (“A significant percentage of the public does not have the
ability to pay for a lawyer, so . . the choice for many people is between a person who lacks a law license
and no help at all.” (footnote omitted)).
81. In a 2015 study by the National Center for State Courts, 33% of the survey participants agreed
with the statement that “hiring a lawyer is usually not worth the cost.” Memorandum from GBA
Strategies to Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/
Topics/Public%20Trust%20and%20Confidence/SoSC_2015_Survey%20Analysis.ashx.
82. See Knake, supra note 61, at 2, 4, 44 (blaming many factors, including individuals being unable
to afford attorneys, lacking information regarding their legal needs, or viewing the provision of legal
input as overly time consuming, scary, convoluted, and cumbersome).
83. SANDEFUR, supra note 70, at 12–13.
84. See id. at 12 (reporting 46% of those surveyed did not seek legal input and, instead, employed
self-help, whereas 16% of respondents did nothing and another 16% received assistance from family
and friends).
85. See Rhode, supra note 65, at 431 (referring to research that finds parties undergoing a divorce
“prefer simpler, less adversarial procedures,” and, thus, many are deterred from hiring attorneys as they
are scared of intensifying conflict (citing Rebecca Aviel, Why Civil Gideon Won’t Fix Family Law,
122 YALE L.J. 2106, 2117–18 (2013))); see also Knake, supra note 61, at 41 (portraying consumers as
skeptical of attorneys and more willing to acquire legal services in familiar environments such as
Walmart (quoting LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF
LAW 815 (2d ed. 2008))).
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phenomenon.86 And why should technology not help educate and
empower consumers to handle some of their simple legal matters
themselves?
The Internet has provided a vehicle for nontraditional providers to make
legal information and services available.87 And the public is availing
themselves of these resources.88 One of the best known of the
nontraditional providers may be LegalZoom.89 According to figures
published with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as of
2011, LegalZoom had served two million customers.90 Avvo, another
online provider, claims to have received 7.5 million legal questions.91 These
are just two of the growing number of online providers of legal services.92
“Online providers in the aggregate have double[d] their revenues since
2006.”93 Ironically, the growing influence and market share of these nonregulated individuals and companies delivering services that formerly were
the province solely of lawyers, such as LegalZoom, RocketLawyer, and
Avvo, seems to have galvanized the bar’s continued opposition to regulatory

86. See Rhode, supra note 65, at 435 (commenting on “the increasing public interest in do-ityourself publications and services” (citing Russell Engler, Turner v. Rogers and the Essential Role of the
Courts in Delivering Access to Justice, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 31, 44 (2013))). Legal service providers
already help consumers prepare documents and, in some cases, represent individuals before federal
agencies and other tribunals. ABA COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVS., ISSUES PAPER
CONCERNING NEW CATEGORIES OF LEGAL SERVICES PROVIDERS 3–4 (2015), http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/office_president/delivery_of_legal_services_completed_
evaluation.pdf.
87. See Bruce, supra note 63 (“[O]ur definition of ‘public access’ to law has implicitly but
dramatically changed. We must now imagine an expanded public seeking smaller and more relevant
granules of information[] and seeking it via the Internet.”).
88. See Perlman, supra note 33, at 102–03 (discussing consumers’ increasing awareness of and
interest in automated document assembly documents).
89. See Richard Granat, What is LegalZoom?, ELAWYERING BLOG (Apr. 8, 2008),
http://www.elawyeringredux.com/2008/04/articles/competition/what-is-legalzoom/
(“LegalZoom . . . offers on-line paralegal document preparation services on a nationwide basis . . . .
LegalZoom, as a non[-]law firm, cannot give legal advice of any kind, cannot modify a customer’s
answers in any way, and cannot do any custom drafting that is responsive to a customer’s particular set
of facts.”).
90. LegalZoom.com, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 1 (May 10, 2012),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1286139/000104746912005763/a2209299zs-1.htm.
91. Lorelei Laird, Avvo Founder Tells Lawyers to ‘Get Rid of UPL’ If They Want Innovation and Access
to Justice, ABA J. (Aug. 03, 2015, 08:45 PM CDT), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/avvo_
founder_tells_lawyers_to_get_rid_of_upl_if_they_want_innovation_and_to.
92. See id. (noting one former state bar president admitted “his state bar was initially scared of
organizations like Avvo and LegalZoom”).
93. ILL. STATE BAR ASS’N’S TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVS., REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (2016), https://www.isba.org/sites/default/files/committees/Future%20
of%20Legal%20Services%20Report.pdf (citation omitted).
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reform.94
2. Corporate Customers
For many years, general counsel and other executives in corporations
have demonstrated that they are growing weary of inefficiencies and the lack
of service from outside counsel.95 At the same time, in surveys of managing
partners of law firms, partners have repeatedly reported that they are not
inclined to change the way they bill or staff matters, and the most likely
change agent to the terms of service delivery would be corporate law
departments.96 With an oversupply of lawyers competent to service
corporate needs, general counsels are wisely driving down the costs their
corporation pays in legal fees.97 Corporate law departments are outsourcing
and insourcing more work away from private lawyers and law firms.98
In addition, corporations are refusing to pay for the training of new
lawyers, often barring associates of limited experience from working on their
matters.99 At the same time, corporate counsel and firms are hiring
attorneys directly out of law school,100 then training them from the
94. See HOUSE OF DELEGATES RESOLUTION 105 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (adopted as revised &
amended), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/2016mymres/105.pdf
(“[N]othing contained in this Resolution abrogates in any manner existing ABA policy prohibiting
non[]lawyer ownership of law firms or the core values adopted by the House of Delegates.”).
95. See William D. Henderson, Three Generations of U.S. Lawyers: Generalists, Specialists, Project
Managers, 70 MD. L. REV. 373, 381 (2011) (explaining general counsels’ goal is to find “methods of
workplace organization and process that will deliver higher quality legal inputs and outputs” and “drive
down overall costs to their corporation”).
96. Cf. id. at 388 (indicating most law firm partners are less likely to alter ingrained work habits
and, instead, are more likely to view the pressure for lower fees as cynical).
97. Id. at 381.
98. In Altman Weil’s 2016 Law Firms in Transition survey, for example, 68% of managing partners
reported their firm was “losing business to corporate law departments” that are taking more work in
house. ERIC A. SEEGER & THOMAS S. CLAY, ALTMAN WEIL, INC., LAW FIRMS IN TRANSITION: AN
ALTMAN WEIL FLASH SURVEY 12 (2016), http://www.altmanweil.com/dir_docs/resource/
95e9df8e-9551-49da-9e25-2cd868319447_document.pdf [hereinafter 2016 ALTMAN WEIL FLASH
SURVEY]. Similar results were reported in 2015. See THOMAS S. CLAY & ERIC A. SEEGER, ALTMAN
WEIL, INC., LAW FIRMS IN TRANSITION: AN ALTMAN WEIL FLASH SURVEY 20 (2015),
http://www.altmanweil.com/dir_docs/resource/1c789ef2-5cff-463a-863a-2248d23882a7_
document.pdf (reporting 67% of the managing partners and chairs polled indicated that corporate law
departments were taking business away from the firm by insourcing more legal work).
99. See Henderson, supra note 95, at 380 (crediting the market’s overabundance of specialized
attorneys for strongly reducing corporate clients’ incentive to subsidize entry-level lawyers training,
especially when such training comes “at inflated pay scales that are disconnected from the value
provided to clients” (citation omitted)).
100. NALP hiring data shows that in 1992, while 72.5% of law school graduates started jobs in
the legal field, 59% started jobs at law firms. Employment Rate of New Law Grads Unchanged as Both the
Number of Graduates and the Number of Jobs Found Decline, NALP (Oct. 2016),
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beginning in a corporate mindset.101 Furthermore, they are bringing work
previously provided to outside counsel in-house, where they can better keep
an eye on the costs.102
B. The Current Model Is Not Working Well for Lawyers.
As mentioned in the prior Section, lawyers who serve individuals have
competition from Internet providers and those who serve corporations are
losing their business to outsourcing or insourcing.103 Meanwhile, newer
members of the profession face stark struggles.
Newer lawyers struggle with unemployment and underemployment.
New lawyers graduate from law school with increased debt and fewer job
choices.104 Of those who are employed, the starting salaries are startlingly
low.105 College students have gotten the memo, and law school
http://www.nalp.org/1016research#table1. Thus, 13.5% of 1992 law school graduates began fulltime jobs in a legal capacity at a non-law firm business or organization. Id. In 2012, the law firm
percentage dropped to a near all-time low of 49.5% and the business percentage jumped up to 18.1%.
Employment for the Class Of 2011—Selected Findings, NALP 2 (2012), http://www.nalp.org/uploads/
Classof2011SelectedFindings.pdf.
101. See Henderson, supra note 95, at 380–81 (analyzing the immense supply of corporate
attorneys due to “the specialized technical skills young lawyers have learned from their large law firm
training”).
102. For example, the Association of Corporate Counsel’s 2011 census showed growth of inhouse legal departments through the recession and “that in-house counsel are turning less frequently
to outside counsel to handle their legal matters and they are handling more work in-house.” Association
of Corporate Counsel Census Reveals Power Shift from Law Firms to Corporate Legal Departments, ASS’N CORP.
COUNSEL (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.acc.com/aboutacc/newsroom/pressreleases/acc_census_
press.cfm.
103. In its 2016 survey of managing partners of over 356 firms of fifty or more employees,
including almost half of the top 350 largest United States firms, Altman Weil asked whether firms were
losing work to “[c]orporate law departments in-sourcing more legal work.” 2016 ALTMAN WEIL
FLASH SURVEY, supra note 98, at 5. Sixty-eight percent responded affirmatively that they were “[t]aking
business . . . now” whereas 24.2% said it was a “[p]otential threat” and only 5.1% were not concerned.
Id.
104. The ABA requires law schools to report employment data as of ten months following
graduation. See Employment Statistics, VT. L. SCH., http://www.vermontlaw.edu/careers/employmentstatistics (last visited May 14, 2017) (acknowledging law schools report the statistics ten months after
graduation every year). As of March 2016, only 59.2% of the 2015 law school graduates had full-time,
long-term legal employment, which required bar passage and were not subsidized by their law schools.
2015 Law Graduate Employment Data, ABA SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO B. (Apr. 26, 2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to
_the_bar/reports/2015_law_graduate_employment_data.authcheckdam.pdf. Nearly 10% of each of
the classes of 2014 and 2015 reported they were “[u]nemployed/[s]eeking.” Id.
105. In the twenty years between 1991 and 2011, NALP figures show the distribution of income
of new lawyers at nine months after graduation has widened from a bell curve to two peaks. Salaries
for New Lawyers: An Update on Where We Are and How We Got Here, NALP (Aug. 2012),
http://www.nalp.org/august2012research; see also Employment Data for Recent Graduates, NYU L.,
http://www.law.nyu.edu/careerservices/employmentstatistics (last visited May 14, 2017) (indicating
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applications are down.106 We have seen a drop in the number of new
lawyers being admitted to practice law.107 And Pew Research Center
reports that 10,000 people a day are reaching the age of sixty-five.108 Thus,
not too far in the future, the profession will experience an exponential
increase in the number of lawyers retiring or leaving the practice.
While they remain in practice, it appears that lawyers are struggling.
Research shows lawyers are increasingly suffering from substance abuse,
mental illness, and anxiety disorders—at a much higher rate than other highstress professions.109
The lawyers providing services to low- or moderate-income clientele are
primarily solo and small firm practitioners.110 According to the most recent
data from the ABA, 49% of American practicing lawyers are solo
practitioners.111 And this population of lawyers is under financial strain.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data on lawyer earnings is striking.
Over the past thirty years, solo practitioners have realized a significant loss
in income, adjusted for inflation. In 1967, a solo practitioner’s average
the ABA switched the reporting deadline from nine months to ten months after graduation starting
with the Class of 2014). Over time, more new lawyers reported income in the lower range. Salaries for
New Lawyers: An Update on Where We are and How We Got Here, supra. In the 1990s, 45% of the lawyers
reported income in the $30–40,000 range, whereas in 2011, 52% reported income in the $40-65,000
range. See id. (reporting the 1991 data reflects 40% of salaries were in the $30–40,000 range, and
indicating by 1996 that range increased to 45%). Meanwhile, the graph of those who reported a big
law salary sharpened into spikes. See id. (noting the two spikes emerged with the Class of 2000 when
big law firms increased starting salaries and more law graduates began taking jobs with large firms).
Whereas 6% were making the large median income of $90,000 by the end of the 1990s, 14% reported
income at the median level of $125,000 in 2000 and at the salary of $160,000 in 2011. Id.
106. According to the Law School Admission Council, 2015 was the fifth straight year of
declining law school applicants. End-of-Year Summary: ABA (Applicants, Applications & Admissions),
LSATs, Credential Assembly Service, LSAC http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/data/lsac-volumesummary (last visited May 14, 2017).
107. According to the National Conference on Bar Admissions, the scores continue to slide from
2014 and are “likely to continue for at least a couple more years.” Mark Hansen, Multistate Bar Exam
Average Score Falls to 33-Year Low, ABA J. (Mar. 31, 2016, 02:53 PM CDT), http://www.
abajournal.com/news/article/multistate_bar_exam_average_score_falls_to_33_year_low.
108. See D’vera Cohn & Paul Taylor, Baby Boomers Approach 65 – Glumly, PEW RES. CTR.
(Dec. 20, 2010), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2010/12/20/baby-boomers-approach-65-glumly/
(predicting roughly 10,000 individuals will hit the age of sixty-five every day for the next nineteen years).
109. Patrick R. Krill et al., The Prevalence of Substance Use and Other Mental Health Concerns Among
American Attorneys, 10 J. ADDICTION MED. 46, 51 (2016).
110. See Ann Juergens, Valuing Small Firm and Solo Law Practice: Models for Expanding Service to
Middle-Income Clients, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 80, 95–96 (2012) (“[S]mall and solo firms are where
working people go for legal help—when they go to a lawyer at all . . . .” (citations omitted)).
111. See Lawyer Demographics: Year 2016, ABA http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/market_research/lawyer-demographics-tables-2016.authcheckdam.pdf
(providing statistics on the percentage of solo practitioners for the years 1980, 1991, 2000, and 2005,
during which the statistics have remained between 45–49%).
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income was $10,850, which was $74,806 adjusted to 2013 dollars.112 By
1988, solo practitioners were earning $74,735, as adjusted for inflation.113
In 2010, a solo practitioner earned $49,741, as adjusted for inflation.114
Incredibly, “[s]olo practitioners saw their buying power shrink by over 34%
from 1988 to 2010.”115
Partnership income is also published by the IRS, but the figures include
all sorts of partnerships—big law and small partnerships—but not LLCs.116
Partnership income rose steeply compared to solo practitioner income until
the Great Recession, at which time it declined 16% in real earnings between
2008 and 2011.117
Furthermore, lawyers have a perception that they are billing more than
they are. Responding to a 2012 survey by LexisNexis, lawyers reported
billing rates between 60%–92%.118 In other words, they reported billing
6.9 hours for every 8.9 hours worked.119 In contrast, recent data released
by Clio, a company that provides a project management application,120
paints a sharply different picture. Clio aggregated data from about 40,000
solo and small-to-medium-sized firm attorneys, who used the Clio
application system during 2015.121 The data shows that lawyers logged only
“2.2 hours of billable time per day,” which amounts to just over a quarter
of an eight-hour day, and actually collected payment on only 1.5 hours per
day, or 86% of the hours actually billed.122 What are the non-billable tasks
that are consuming lawyers’ time and attributing to their dropping income?
It seems reasonable to assume that a large amount of this time is spent on
nonlawyer activity including attempts to understand and use technology.123
112. BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE GLASS HALF FULL: THE DECLINE AND REBIRTH OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 47 (2015).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 47–48.
118. LEXISNEXIS, LEXISNEXIS LAW FIRM: BILLABLE HOURS SURVEY REPORT 6 (2012),
http://www.lexisnexis.com/law-firm-practice-management/documents/Billable-Hours-Survey.pdf.
119. Id. at 2.
120. See About Clio, CLIO, https://www.clio.com/about/ (last visited May 14, 2017) (declaring
the company’s goal is to improve lawyers’ quality of practice by providing “cloud-based practice
management technologies”).
121. CLIO, LEGAL TRENDS REPORT 3 (2016), https://files.goclio.com/marketo/ebooks/2016Legal-Trends-Report.pdf.
122. Id. at 5.
123. According to a survey of lawyers in Illinois who attended a statewide future law conference
in 2016, purchasing, understanding, and using technology was an over-riding concern. THE FUTURE
IS NOW: LEGAL SERVICES 2.016 SUMMARY REPORT 10 (2016), https://2hla47293e2hberdu2chdy71-
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IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES
For several decades, jurisdictions outside the United States have been
expanding the permissible business models of lawyers. ABSs are allowed in
Australia, the United Kingdom, parts of Canada, and, to various lesser
extents, some other European and Asian countries.124 It is instructive for
the regulators in the United States to consider the experiences of these other
jurisdictions.
A. Australia
The Australian state of New South Wales gradually modified its
regulations of lawyers beginning in the 1990s.125 Lawyers were permitted
to form multidisciplinary practices with other professionals as long as they
“retain[ed] the majority voting rights . . . and . . . at least 51% of the net
income of the partnership.”126 In 2001, this limitation was eliminated by
legislation that allowed legal services providers to incorporate, becoming
incorporated legal practices (ILPs), which could include multidisciplinary
practices, meaning providers who may or may not be lawyers.127 The stated
wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/The-Future-Is-Now-2.016-Summary-Report.pdf.
124. “Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, and Poland” allow multidisciplinary practices
in various forms. ABA Comm’n on the Future of Legal Servs., Issues Paper Regarding Alternative Business
Structures, supra note 2 (citation omitted). Regarding ABSs, Scotland, Spain, Italy, and Denmark all
permit ABSs but require lawyers to have a majority control. See id. (indicating Scotland permits
nonlawyer ownership up to 49%, Denmark allows such ownership up to 10%, Spain caps nonlawyer
ownership at 25%, and Italy places the maximum nonlawyer ownership at 33% (citation omitted)).
Singapore recently enacted statutes allowing nonlawyer ownership of up to 25% of entities that are
called Legal Disciplinary Practices (LDPs), but does not permit such ownership in MDPs. Id. at 6–7
(citation omitted).
125. See id. at 5 n.14 (stating New South Wales began allowing MDPs in 1994); see also Tahlia
Gordon & Steve Mark, The Australian Experiment: Out with the Old, in With the Bold, in THE RELEVANT
LAWYER, REIMAGINING THE FUTURE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 185, 188 (Paul A. Haskins ed.,
2015) (recounting legislative efforts in New South Wales, including new 1991 legislation that governed
until the MDP legislation took force in 1994).
126. Gordon & Mark, supra note 125, at 188.
127. On July 1, 2001, the Legal Profession Amendment (Incorporated Legal Practices) Act 2000
(the 2000 Act) and the Legal Profession Amendment (Incorporated Legal Practices) Regulation 2001
(the 2001 Regulation) became effective. See Legal Profession Amendment (Incorporated Legal Practices) Act
2000 (NSW) s 1 (Austl.) (stating the date of commencement will be subsequently announced by
proclamation); Legal Profession Amendment (Incorporated Legal Practices) Regulation 2001 (NSW) explanatory
note, cl 1 (Austl.) (proclaiming its date of commencement to be July 1, 2001); see also Incorporated
Legal Practices, L. SOC’Y N.S.W., http://www.lawsociety.com.au/cs/groups/public/documents/
internetcostguidebook/008712.pdf (last visited May 14, 2017) (recognizing ILPs have been permitted
ever since the 2000 Act took effect on July 1, 2001). The 2000 Act and 2001 Regulation amended the
Legal Profession Act 1987 to enable providers of legal services in New South Wales to incorporate by
registering a company with the Australian Securities and Investment Commission, which is the agency
responsible for ensuring compliance with Australian corporations legislation. See Act 2000 (NSW)
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purpose for the legislation was:
removing regulatory barriers between Australian states and territories to
facilitate a . . . national legal services market and regulatory framework; greater
flexibility in choice of business structures for law practices; enhancing choice
and protection for consumers of legal services; enabling greater participation
in the international legal services market; providing improved access to justice;
and providing “one-stop shopping” for consumers of legal services.128

Under the 2001 legislation, the ILPs, in addition to individual lawyers, are
regulated.129 In making the entity, rather than only the individual,
responsible for ethical compliance, Australian regulators sought to have
firms set in place an ethical infrastructure that was proactive in focus.130
Part of this entity regulation requires ILPs to appoint a “legal practitioner
director” and be able to demonstrate that the incorporated firms have
“appropriate management systems” in place to ensure that all legal services
are provided in accord with professional conduct obligations.131
sch 1 item 47O (permitting investigations of ILPs and authorizing future regulations to extend
investigative functions by reference to the authority of the Australian Securities and Investment
Commission, to which ILPs must also furnish certain documentation); Regulation 2001 (NSW) sch 1
item 5 (amending the 1987 legislation to include a provision pertaining to the director’s report and
financial report that, with regards to an ILP, are required to be prepared and filed with the Australian
Securities and Investment Commission); see also Gordon & Mark, supra note 125, at 188–89 (explaining
how the restrictions imposed upon ownership in MDPs was eliminated by the 2001 legislation that
allowed incorporated legal practices and enabled lawyers and nonlawyers to freely share in receipts);
STEVE MARK, CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES P/L, THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN
AUSTRALIA 4 n.9 (2014), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/professional_
responsibility/2014/05/40th-aba-national-conference-on-professional-responsibility/session1_02_
mark_the_regulatory_framework_in_australia_final.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter MARK, THE
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN AUSTRALIA] (reporting on how the culmination of the 2000 Act and
the 2001 Regulation effectuated the amendments to the 1987 law).
128. Gordon & Mark, supra note 125, at 188.
129. The entity is responsible for designing and implementing the appropriate management
systems, which apply to both lawyers (directly) and all other members of the ILP’s staff, including
nonlawyers (indirectly), thereby promoting ethics and professionalism. MARK, THE REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK IN AUSTRALIA, supra note 127, at 7, 9. Accordingly, this requires the entity to collaborate
with regulators because upon establishing a system designed to promote ethical behavior, regulators or
corporate auditors scrutinize the system to determine its results. Id. at 8–9.
130. It has been said that the system is proactive as the system is intended to prevent and mitigate
against recurring issues. Id. at 8. Moreover, under the collaborative framework established in New
South Wales, regulators proactively work with firms in an effort to decrease the possibility of future
violations by detecting and reducing ethical issues through a system aimed at embedding ethical
behavior. Id. Therefore, both the regulators and the entity proactively seek to avoid problems in the
future, rather than merely having the regulators step in after a lawyer has acted unethically. Id.
131. Id. at 5–6. The legal practitioner director is responsible for establishing the maintaining the
“appropriate management system.” Id. at 6.
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In 2015, New South Wales and Victoria eliminated the requirement for a
director and changed some of the requirements for ILPs through the Legal
Profession Uniform Law (LPUL).132 The new law requires that all
principals, which generally means all partners of the firm or directors of the
corporation,133 be responsible for ensuring that all legal practitioners in the
law practice comply with all professional obligations and that the legal
services provided by the law practice are provided in accordance with the
law and with professional obligations.134 A failure to do so may qualify as
professional misconduct.135 Moreover, although the LPUL was developed
with the idea that each of Australia’s eight states and territories would adopt
it,136 only the two largest states, New South Wales and Victoria, have
adopted it to date.137 However, about 80% of Australian lawyers are
located in New South Wales and Victoria.138
Since 2007, the number of incorporated legal practices has steadily
grown.139 Many Australian firms have changed their structure to operate
as ILPs.140 A significant decline in consumer complaints confirms that the
proactive management regulation systems has had a positive impact on the
132. Compare Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT) s 107(1)–(2) (Austl.) (requiring ILPs to have one
legal practitioner director, at minimum, who is “responsible for the management of the legal services
provided in the [Australian Capital Territories] by the incorporated legal practice”), with Legal Profession
Uniform Law (No. 16a) 2014 (NSW) ch 3 pt 3.7 s 105 (Austl.) (providing a new business structure for
ILPs, which does not require a legal practitioner director, but rather requires at least one authorized
principal).
133. Legal Profession Uniform Law (No. 16a) ch 1 pt 1.2 s 6(1).
134. See id. ch 3 pt 3.2 s 35(1) (extending liability pertaining to the law practice’s violation of the
law to principals of the practice if certain conditions are satisfied).
135. Id. s 35(2).
136. See MARK, THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN AUSTRALIA, supra note 127, at 10–11
(discussing the then-pending legislation and pointing out it was intended to originally apply in
Australian’s two largest states, New South Wales and Victoria, with implementation of the law
throughout the remainder of the country at a later date).
137. See A New Framework for Practising Law in NSW, L. SOC’Y N.S.W., http://www.lawsociety.
com.au/ForSolictors/professionalstandards/Ruleslegislation/nationalreform/ (last visited May 14,
2017) (highlighting the various states’ reservations that vitiated the intention to bring about uniformity,
but praising the “common legal services market across” Victoria and New South Wales brought into
existence when the two jurisdictions adopted of LPUL).
138. MARK, THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN AUSTRALIA, supra note 127, at 11.
139. OFFICE OF THE LEGAL SERVS. COMM’R, 2014–15 ANNUAL REPORT 12 (2014–2015),
http://www.olsc.nsw.gov.au/Documents/Annual%20Report%202014%202015.pdf
[hereinafter
2014–15 ANNUAL REPORT].
140. Compare id. (reporting by mid-2015, over 1,800 incorporated legal practices were operating
in New South Wales), with OFFICE OF THE LEGAL SERVS. COMM’R, 2007–08 ANNUAL REPORT 5
(2007–2008), http://www.olsc.nsw.gov.au/Documents/0708_olsc_annual_report.pdf [hereinafter
2007–08 ANNUAL REPORT] (indicating over 800 firms expressed a desire to incorporate or be publicly
traded since 2001).
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quality of lawyer services rendered under the new regulatory scheme.141
B. England and Wales
The Legal Services Act of 2007 (LSA) radically transformed the
regulatory scheme for lawyers in England and Wales.142 The LSA permits
lawyers to form an ABS that allows external ownership of legal businesses
and multidisciplinary practices.143 The change was long in the making, and
the Australian experience was certainly influential in making it.144
A watershed precursor event was Sir David Clementi’s 2004 report (the
Clementi Report), reviewing and recommending changes in the regulatory
framework for legal services in England and Wales.145 The Clementi
Report recommended ABSs, in which lawyers and nonlawyers both
managed and owned the legal practice.146 In addition, the report proposed
the establishment of regulatory objectives and a new regulatory governance
scheme that would eventually permit multijurisdictional practices.147
Three years later, Parliament enacted the LSA. The regulatory objectives
of the LSA include supporting “the rule of law; . . . improving access to
justice; . . . promoting the interests of consumers; . . . [and] encouraging an
independent, strong, diverse[,] and effective legal profession.”148 Three
141. Compare 2014–15 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 139, at 9 (reporting 1,668 consumer
complaints in New South Wales for the 2014–15 reporting period), with 2007–08 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 140, at 13 (reporting 2,747 consumer complaints in 2006–07 and 2,653 consumer
complaints in 2007–08).
142. See generally Legal Services Act 2007, c. 29 pt. 5 (Eng. & Wales) (providing for ABSs); see also
History of the Reforms, LEGAL SERVS. BD., http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/about_us/history_
reforms/ (last visited May 14, 2017) (expounding upon the provisions set forth in the Legal Services
Act 2007 one of which facilitated lawyers and nonlawyers owning and managing law practices together
through ABSs).
143. Legal Services Act 2007, c. 29 pt. 5.
144. See generally DAVID CLEMENTI, REVIEW OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR LEGAL
SERVICES IN ENGLAND AND WALES 114 & n.43, 123 (2004), http://www.avocatsparis.org/
Presence_Internationale/Droit_homme/PDF/Rapport_Clementi.pdf (pointing out the influence
New South Wales had on model federal rules when it opted to permit nonlawyer ownership, and noting
requirements in the New South Wales’ model).
145. See generally id. at 1 (describing the scope and concern in conducting the review); see also
History of the Reforms, supra note 142 (recognizing the broad implementation of the key recommendations
set forth in the Clementi Report).
146. See generally CLEMENTI, supra note 144, at 105–39 (discussing the demand for LDPs, the
issues presented by LDPs in which management and ownership are separated, regulatory issues
surrounding LDPs, and the demand for and issues with MDPs, and subsequently recommending legal
services be permitted to use ABSs).
147. See id. at 139 (advocating for a regulatory structure that “would represent a major step
toward” MDPs that would bring lawyers and professionals together to provide legal services for
consumers).
148. Legal Services Act 2007, c. 29 pt. 1 s. 1.
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main changes were made to the existing system. With respect to regulation,
a Legal Services Board was created to oversee the regulation of legal services
by approved regulators,149 such as the Solicitors Regulation Authority
(SRA) for solicitors150 and the Bar Standards Board for barristers,151 and
to oversee a new system to handle consumer complaints, Parliament created
the Office for Legal Complaints and an Ombudsman Scheme.152
The LSA facilitated ABSs by providing that the firm itself, in addition to
the individuals, must be licensed and regulated.153 As part of the entity
regulation component, each firm, including ABS firms, must designate an
officer responsible for ensuring that professional obligations are met (the
Compliance Officer for Legal Practice) and an officer responsible for
ensuring that sound financial measures and management practices are
maintained (the Compliance Officer for Finance and Administration).154
In addition, any firm wishing to employ a nonlawyer as an owner or manager
of an ABS must apply to the SRA for approval and satisfy the SRA that the
individual is fit and proper to assume that role.155
The number of incorporated companies (ABSs) in the United Kingdom
has continued to rise,156 and the trend is likely to continue. In just one of
many surveys of legal services purchasers documenting the desire for
149. See generally id. pt. 2 (providing for the creation of the Legal Services Board, and outlining its
functions).
150. See Who We Are and What We Do, SOLIC. REG. AUTHORITY, http://www.sra.org.uk/
consumers/what-sra-about.page (last visited May 14, 2017) (describing the SRA’s regulatory authority,
which extends to England’s and Wale’s solicitors, law firms, firm managers or employees who are not
lawyers, and other lawyers).
151. See B. STANDARDS BOARD, https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk (last visited May 14,
2017) (indicating the Bar Standards Board regulates barristers, as well as specialized legal services
business, to protect the public interest).
152. See generally Legal Services Act 2007, c. 29 pt. 6 (enumerating provisions regarding legal
complaints).
153. See id. pt. 5 § 72 (providing a definition of and for the regulation of “licensed bodies”).
154. See SRA Authorisation Rules 2011, SOLIC. REG. AUTHORITY, http://www.sra.org.uk/
solicitors/handbook/authorisationrules/content.page (last visited May 14, 2017) (describing the
compliance officer’s requirements in rule 8.5).
155. See Introduction to the Suitability Test, SOLIC. REG. AUTHORITY, http://www.sra.org.uk/
solicitors/handbook/suitabilitytest/part1/content.page (last visited May 14, 2017) (explaining the test
applies to non-solicitors who will work in the legal profession). For the SRA’s “suitability test,”
outlining the necessary requirements for admission, see Suitability Test, SOLIC. REG. AUTHORITY,
www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/handbook/suitabilitytest/content.page (last visited May 14, 2017).
156. See Dan Bindman, Report: ABSs Punch Well Above Their Weight, LEGALFUTURES (Apr. 27, 2016,
12:01 am),
http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/report-abss-punch-well-above-their-weight
(acknowledging “the structure of the profession is changing,” and while noting partnership has held
strong as the dominant organization in domestic private practice, there is an increasing amount of
organizations outside private practice hiring solicitors, predominantly in industry and commerce
sector).
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broader legal services, a 2016 report by Deloitte indicated that one-third of
purchasers of legal services “want their legal services providers to bring
industry, commercial[,] or non[]legal expertise, which currently they do
not.”157
Models of ABSs now operating in the United Kingdom take many
forms.158 I will mention here two examples of American companies that
have taken advantage of the opportunity to engage with lawyers by
becoming ABSs in England: LegalZoom and Crawford & Company.
The technology company LegalZoom has been offering legal documents
online for over fifteen years.159 More recently, it began connecting
consumers to lawyers through legal plan subscriptions, offering to meet the
legal needs of an individual or business at a low monthly price.160 In 2015,
LegalZoom became the first United States firm to be granted an ABS license
in the United Kingdom.161 It later bought the firm Beaumont Legal, which
offered services in conveyancing, dispute resolution, wills, and estates.162
LegalZoom UK lawyers deliver legal services directly to consumers. A
major development announced by LegalZoom UK in late 2016 is a digital
will that people can update on their phone, creating a “digital scrapbook” of
memories and passwords to pass on to their heirs and that will provide
automatic updates when legal events occur.163
In June 2016, Atlanta, Georgia-based Crawford & Company, self157. DELOITTE, FUTURE TRENDS FOR LEGAL SERVICES: GLOBAL RESEARCH STUDY 7 (2016),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Legal/dttl-legal-futuretrends-for-legal-services.pdf. The survey was of general counsel, CEOs, and other executive managers
of “multinationals and mid-sized companies present in five or more countries.” Id. at 9. “Company
headquarters were split between the U[.]K[.] (27%), North America (25%), Asia Pacific (24%), Europe
(excluding the U[.]K[.]) (21%), and Africa [and] the Middle East (3%).” Id.
158. For an in-depth analysis of various models, see Judith A. McMorrow, UK Alternative Business
Structures for Legal Practice: Emerging Models and Lessons for the US, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 665 (2016) (analyzing
ABS law firms in the United Kingdom and the benefits provided by each).
159. About Us, LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/about-us (last visited May 14, 2017).
160. See Attorneys, LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/attorneys/ (last visited May 14,
2017) (offering “legal help when you need it” upon purchase of either Business Advisory Plan or Legal
Advantage Plus).
161. Neil Rose, LegalZoom Makes Its Move with Beaumont Legal Acquisition, LEGALFUTURES (Dec. 7,
2015), http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/legalzoom-makes-its-move-with-beaumont-legalacquisition.
162. Id.
163. LegalZoom UK CEO Craig Holt explained that the new app, called Legacy, “is the first
significant re-invention of a will since their inception thousands of years ago; creating this next
generation of legal products and services—combining the best technology and legal expertise—is at
the heart of our approach.” Neil Rose, LegalZoom Launches ‘Digital Will’ in First UK Product Roll-Out,
LEGALFUTURES (Nov. 28, 2016), http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/legalzoom-launchesdigital-will-first-uk-product-roll-out.
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described as “one of the world’s largest independent providers of claims
management solutions to the risk management and insurance industry,”164
announced that it is establishing an ABS in the United Kingdom.165 A
spokesman for Crawford UK said “[i]t is imperative that loss adjusting
companies evolve to meet the changing dynamics of the claims sector.
Creating an ABS will allow us to support our clients with a genuine need for
seamless, high-quality claims and legal service.”166 Furthermore, they
indicated they were not “afraid to break the mould in creating proactive
solutions for the challenges ahead.”167
C. Canada
Some provinces of Canada have allowed nonlawyer ownership and/or
multidisciplinary practices for some time.168 For example, the province of
Quebec allows lawyers to practice and share profits with other
professionals.169 Similarly, in Ontario, lawyers are permitted to share
profits and practice with regulated paralegals.170
In August 2014, the Canadian Bar Association171 issued a sweeping
report, Futures: Transforming the Legal Delivery Services in Canada (the Futures
Report),172 which provided a catalyst for significant regulatory changes now
being considered by various law societies across Canada.173
164. Company History, CRAWFORD (last visited May 14, 2017), http://nl.crawfordandcompany.
com/about-us/company-history/full-company-history.aspx.
165. Nick Hilborne, Here Come the Loss Adjusters: US Giant to Launch ABS, LEGALFUTURES
(June 16, 2016), http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/come-loss-adjusters-us-giant-launch-abs.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See CANADIAN BAR ASS’N, FUTURES: TRANSFORMING THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL
SERVICES IN CANADA 41 (2014), http://www.cba.org/CBAMediaLibrary/cba_na/PDFs/CBA%20
Legal%20Futures%20PDFS/Futures-Final-eng.pdf (stating British Columbia and Ontario permit
limited nonlawyer ownership in authorized MDPs (citation omitted)).
169. Id. at 100 n.31.
170. Id.
171. The Canadian Bar Association is a voluntary association, which advocates for its members.
See Why Join?, CANADIAN B. ASS’N, http://www.cba.org/Membership/Why-Join (last visited May 14,
2017) (describing the benefits of membership). The regulation of lawyers is handled by fourteen
“provincial and territorial law societies.” About Us, FED’N L. SOC’YS CAN., http://flsc.ca/aboutus/what-is-the-federation-of-law-societies-of-canada/ (last visited May 14, 2017). Every lawyer in
Canada is required “to be a member of a law society and to be governed by its rules.” Id. The law
societies have a mandate under provincial and territorial law to ensure the public is served by competent
and professional attorneys. Id.
172. CANADIAN BAR ASS’N, supra note 168.
173. See Yamri Taddese, Entity Regulation on the Horizon for Prairie Provinces, CANADIAN LAW & L.
TIMES: LEGAL FEEDS (Dec. 23, 2015), http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/legalfeeds/3047/entityregulation-on-the-horizon-for-prairie-provinces.html (describing pending regulatory developments
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Included within the Futures Report are broad-reaching recommendations
that lawyers be allowed to practice in ABSs that permit fee sharing,
multidisciplinary practice, and nonlawyer ownership.174 Several aspects of
the report condition the nonlawyer ownership, management, and
investment with fiduciary and ethical requirements applied to the entity, not
just the individual lawyer, including protecting client confidentiality,
guarding against conflicts of interest, and other ethical duties that lawyers
must uphold.175
According to the Futures Report, the recommendations “would advance
the public interest in improving access to legal services” and, in addition,
acknowledge lawyers’ central role in providing legal services.176 “Properly
interpreted, the professionalism of lawyers allows for innovation in the
provision of legal services, as well as the ability to compete in a more global
marketplace.”177
The law societies in Canada are proceeding individually and together to
consider modifications to lawyer regulation. For example, Nova Scotia has
adopted regulatory objectives and is considering proactive and entity
regulation, as well as amendments to the Code of Professional Conduct “to
eliminate barriers to fee sharing with non[]lawyers.”178 Based on a
recommendation from the Law Society of Manitoba, the Manitoba
Legislature enacted legislation broadening the definition of “law firm” to
include a law corporation or any joint arrangement and granting the Law
Society authority to permit and regulate “different types of arrangements to
provide legal services, including arrangements between lawyers and between
lawyers and non[]lawyers.”179 In addition, Manitoba and the other two
Prairie provinces, Alberta and Saskatchewan, are banding together to study
the issue of entity regulation.180 There is also a movement afoot among the
law societies to coordinate their efforts and develop national standards, for
prompted after the Futures Report emboldened law societies by encouraging such regulatory bodies to
reimagine the way in which the legal “profession is governed in hopes of improving access to justice”).
174. CANADIAN BAR ASS’N, supra note 168, at 42–44.
175. Id. at 42.
176. Id. at 40.
177. Id.
178. Legal Services Regulation: The Policy Framework, N.S. BARRISTERS’ SOC’Y, http://nsbs.org/legalservices-regulation-policy-framework (last visited May 14, 2017).
179. The Legal Profession Act, C.C.S.M. 2002, c L107 r 24.1, amended by S.M. 2015, c.29 (Can.
Man.) 40th Legislature of Manitoba, Government Bill 19, The Legal Profession Amendment Act,
http://web2.gov.mb.ca/bills/40-4/pdf/b019.pdf.
180. Taddese, supra note 173. Notably, the Provinces opted for a collaborative approach to the
study as they believe better, more efficient results will be achieved through the combination of “a
diversity of perspectives from different jurisdictions.” Id.
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example with respect to admission, mobility between provinces, and
discipline standards,181 so we may at some point expect to see a harmonized
approach to regulatory reform.
V. A SUMMARY OF THE CONTROVERSY: PROS AND CONS
In the United States, discussions about changing lawyer regulation to
allow ABSs seem to repeatedly stall at the emotional or theoretical level.
Opponents call for evidence that ABSs would be helpful and not cause
harm.182 Such evidence must be garnered from the jurisdictions that allow
ABSs and deduced from the current state of affairs in the United States.183
Correlation is not necessarily causation. But we should look at all the
evidence.
A. How Would ABSs Be Helpful?
1. Increasing Access to Legal Services
As mentioned earlier, research shows that many low- and moderateincome individuals,184 as well as small business owners, do not have their
legal needs met.185 It has been estimated that up to 80% of the legal needs
of low income individuals in the United States are unmet.186 Allowing
ABSs is only one of many ideas put forth to address this gap.187
The World Justice Project created the Rule of Law Index to measure and
provide a ranking “of the extent to which countries adhere to the rule of law

181. See National Initiatives, FED’N L. SOC’YS CAN., http://flsc.ca/national-initiatives/ (last visited
May 14, 2017) (enumerating the Federation of Law Societies of Canada’s efforts, alongside the many
Canadian law societies, to promulgate consistent rules and practices).
182. See McMorrow, supra note 158, at 675 (reciting opponents’ concerns that the benefits of
ABSs will actualize and their demands for evidence that such regulatory reforms will not affect
professional judgment).
183. See id. at 675, 708 (responding to opponents’ demand for evidence by noting the United
Kingdom and Australian experiences with ABSs close the informational gap and provide the United
States with “concrete evidence” that ABS models should be more openly considered); see also ILL.
STATE BAR ASS’N’S TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVS., supra note 93, at 22 (recognizing
only two United States’ jurisdictions permit ABSs, whereas ABSs exist in a variety of forms in other
countries).
184. See discussion supra Section III.A.1.
185. See discussion supra Section III.A.2.
186. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2016), https://lsc-live.app.box.com/v/
LSC-2015-AnnualReport.
187. See Knake, supra note 61, at 3 (refuting the effectiveness of proffered solutions such as more
pro bono work, an expansion of governmental or nonprofit legal assistance, and increasing the number
of solo practitioners and small firms).
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in practice.”188 As mentioned above, the 2016 World Justice Project Rule
of Law Index gave the United States a ranking of 18 out of 113 countries, as
compared to a rank of 19 out of the 98 countries measured in 2014 and a
rank of 19 out of the 102 countries considered in 2015.189 However, the
United States is losing ground on a civil justice sub-factor measuring
whether “people can access and afford civil justice.”190 In 2014 and 2015,
reports on this sub-factor indicated the United States ranked 65th out of the
98 and 102 countries studied, respectively.191 However, in 2016, the United
States ranked 94th out of the 113 countries analyzed,192 representing a drop
of 29 positions in the rankings. This statistic signifies that the people of 93
countries, including Belarus, Kazakhstan, Myanmar, Russia, Venezuela, and
Zimbabwe, to name a few, are potentially more aware of their rights and
obligations, as well as being able to access and afford legal representation
and civil courts more easily, than the people of the United States.193
Moreover, it should be noted in regards to this sub-factor of affordable civil
legal services, where the United States lost 29 positions between 2015 and
2016,194 Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada all ranked significantly
higher than the United States, at numbers 42, 46, and 48 out of the 113
countries accounted for in the study.195 However, whether there is any
relationship to the regulatory framework in these countries is not known.
Many state bar association committees and task forces have issued reports
calling for reform based in part on the lack of access to justice in their state.
For example, every year since 2010, the New York Permanent Commission
on Access to Justice has held hearings, considered testimony, and
documented an increasing need for resources to bridge the access to justice
gap.196 Similarly, the unmet need for legal services has been documented

188. Current & Historical Data, WORLD JUST. PROJECT, https://worldjusticeproject.org/ourwork/wjp-rule-law-index/wjp-rule-law-index-2016/current-historical-data (last visited May 14, 2017).
189. WJP Rule of Law Index: Rankings for Four Sub-Factors, NOT JUST FOR LAW. (Apr. 17, 2017),
http://notjustforlawyers.com/wjp-rule-of-law-index-rankings/.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See id. (“[T]his means that the persons living in those countries have better access to civil
justice than Americans do. In most if not all aspects of their lives, they are better able to learn their
rights and obligations, and better able to assure their rights and obligations are respected.”).
194. See id. (reporting the United States grading in at 65th out of 102 countries in 2014 and yet,
in 2016, plummeting to the 94th position out of 113 countries considered for the sub-factor measuring
the accessibility and affordability of civil justice).
195. For an excel sheet displaying the countries’ rankings for the sub-factor, see id.
196. LAURA SNYDER, DEMOCRATIZING LEGAL SERVICES 45–46. (2016) (citations omitted).
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in Illinois,197 Michigan,198 Oregon,199 Utah,200 and Washington.201
There is of course no guarantee that ABSs will significantly improve
access.202 But a leading expert on the access to justice problem, Gillian
Hadfield, has unequivocally stated that there is no humanly possible amount
of legal aid or pro bono services that could satisfy the unmet need for legal
services and that only by permitting a change in regulations to allow ABSs
do we have a chance of addressing this country’s access to justice
problem.203
The legal profession’s purpose, as stated in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, “is to make educated legal representation available to the
public.”204 This concept was brought into the current rules as requiring
“competent representation to a client.”205 Doesn’t it follow that the legal
profession has the obligation to provide competent legal representation to
potential clients? And if lawyer-made ethical rules prohibiting certain
business structures impede that provision of legal services—even in a
limited way—shouldn’t they be examined and altered to effectuate the
profession’s purpose?
197. ILL. STATE BAR ASS’N’S TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVS., supra note 93,
at 7.
198. See STATE BAR OF MICH. 21ST CENTURY PRACTICE TASK FORCE, ENVISIONING A NEW
FUTURE TODAY 3 (2016), https://www.michbar.org/file/future/21c_WorkProduct.pdf (recognizing
the widening “justice gap” existing within the United States as evidenced by an estimated 80% deficit
in unmet legal needs).
199. See generally D. MICHAEL DALE, THE STATE OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN OREGON (2000),
https://www.osbar.org/_docs/resources/LegalNeedsreport.pdf (assessing the unmet legal needs of
those with less resources in the State of Oregon).
200. See generally THOMAS M. CLARKE, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, NON-LAWYER LEGAL
ASSISTANCE ROLES: EFFICACY, DESIGN, AND IMPLEMENTATION (2015), https://www.utcourts.
gov/committees/limited_legal/NonLawyer%20Legal%20Assistance%20Roles.pdf
(exploring
nonlawyer legal assistance as a measure to satisfy unmet legal needs for low-income people in Utah).
201. See generally CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS STUDY UPDATE COMM., 2015 WASHINGTON STATE
CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS STUDY UPDATE (2015), http://ocla.wa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/
CivilLegalNeedsStudy_October2015_V21_Final10_14_15.pdf (identifying the plight of low-income
Washingtonians facing unaffordable civil litigation).
202. See Perlman, supra note 33, at 53 (disagreeing with the notion that ABS models, alone, are
sufficient to catalyze bold improvements).
203. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice Through the (Un)corporate
Practice of Law, 38 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. (SUPPLEMENT) 43, 46 (2014), http://ac.elscdn.com/S014481881300063X/1-s2.0-S014481881300063X-main.pdf?_tid=7028894e-2518-11e7af38-00000aab0f27&acdnat=1492617435_a944a66381678eb82ced2098968a271c (“The only way to
achieve the kind of scale and innovation needed . . . is through the corporate practice of law.”); see also
Knake, supra note 61, at 11 (concluding the unmet need for legal services can be only be met by allowing
law practices to be financed by corporations and corporations to deliver legal services).
204. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
205. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2012).
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2. Flexibility and Reduced Pricing for Clients
Related to increasing access to justice, a business structure offering the
services of both lawyers and nonlawyers may improve customer service and
lower costs to the customer.206 There are many nonlegal matters that are
intrinsically connected to legal ones.207 The ABS model allows lawyers and
those in other specialties to come together and use their skills to provide
holistic services to their clients in a one-stop shopping environment.208
From the clients’ perspective, they can obtain advice and services from
various specialties, rather than being forced to take their legal questions to
a lawyer, their accounting questions to an accountant, and possibly other
questions to other specialists, such as social workers.209 This can lead to a
team approach, which better aids the client and reduces costs.210 Clients
who seek out the associated nonlegal service first may also decide to access
legal services if they are conveniently located in the same place.211 This
might enable clients to avoid some of their legal problems or resolve them
sooner (and potentially less expensively).212
Data from the United Kingdom supports an argument that ABSs provide
206. See Adams, supra note 6, at 796 (concluding attorneys and nonlawyers need to unite to more
effectively meet the needs of clients due to the “indistinct line between legal and non[]legal services”).
207. See id. at 810 (agreeing clients frequently experience other professional service needs
inseparable from their legal needs (citing Cliff Ennico, How to Hire an Attorney, ENTREPRENEUR,
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/58326 (last visited May 14, 2017))).
208. See id. (“[C]lients would find the alternative business structure appealing as a convenient
one-stop shop that could offer a comprehensive solution to their legal and non[]legal issues.”).
209. See ABA Comm’n on the Future of Legal Servs., Issues Paper Regarding Alternative Business
Structures, supra note 2 (reciting proponents’ argument that ABSs will facilitate “a ‘one-stop shopping’
approach for problems requiring services in different fields” (quoting John S. Dzienkowski & Robert
J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and the American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the
Delivery of Legal Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 117 (2000))).
210. See id. (crediting ABSs for providing clients with an integrated team approach, thus, saving
clients both money and time (citing John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice
and the American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in the TwentyFirst Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 117–18 (2000))); see also Adams, supra note 6, at 799 (noting
accounting firms would like to enhance the services they can provide by collaborating with law firms
and clients desire such an integrated professional service).
211. See Knake, supra note 61, at 7 (imagining creative ABSs, such as a collaboration between a
legal service provider and Walmart wherein “Wal[m]art could add a legal assistance window next to the
banking center or health care provider located in its stores” and, thus, could extend legal services to
low-income individuals who are the least likely to have access to legal services they need and who
Walmart already seeks to serve by providing financial services).
212. See ABA Comm’n on the Future of Legal Servs., Issues Paper Regarding Alternative Business
Structures, supra note 2 (identifying ABSs ability to save clients time and money while ensuring they
receive higher quality product at a lower transaction cost (quoting John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J.
Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and the American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery
of Legal Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 118 (2000))).
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higher quality services at lower prices. In April 2016, the Legal Services
Board (LSB) issued a report on prices individual consumers pay for three
types of legal services: conveyancing, divorce, and wills.213 The findings
were that the majority of services cost less when delivered by ABS firms,
although the difference was not significant.214 In the most recent version
of the United Kingdom’s survey of the impact of reforms on legal
consumers, “67% of consumers who paid for” private legal work reported
that they received “good or very good value for [their] money,” which was
a marked increase from the first consumer survey conducted in 2011.215
3. Innovation
As mentioned earlier, there are only three acceptable ways that lawyers
can currently organize themselves as they deliver legal services: sole
proprietorships, legal partnerships, or LLCs.216 In these structures, money
is received as fees and profits are distributed to partners/owners at the end
of the fiscal year.217 There is little incentive to forego distributions and
invest in technology or other long-term solutions to better serve clients or
potential clients.218
In contrast, research supports the assertion that ABSs encourage novel,
online solutions. A July 2015 report for the SRA and LSB prepared by
Enterprise Research Center states:
While the existence of ABS is a recent phenomenon[,] our analysis which
213. OMB RESEARCH, PRICES OF INDIVIDUAL CONSUMER LEGAL SERVICES RESEARCH
REPORT 3
(2016),
https://research.legalservicesboard.org.uk/wp-content/media/Prices-ofIndividual-Consumer-Legal-Services.pdf.
214. See generally id. at 14, 25, 38 (comparing ABS firms’ and non-ABS firms’ average prices for
services involving conveyances, divorces, wills, estate administration, and power of attorney).
215. LEGAL SERVS. CONSUMER PANEL, CONSUMER IMPACT REPORT 20 (2014), http://www.
legalservicesconsumerpanel.org.uk/publications/research_and_reports/documents/Consumer%20I
mpact%20Report%203.pdf.
216. See generally Adams, supra note 6, at 778–84 (evaluating the evolution of permissible law firm
structures).
217. See id. at 779 (explaining in general partnerships, the firm’s profits are taxed as partners’
personal income when the profits are distributed to partners (citing 26 U.S.C. § 701 (2011))).
218. See id. at 789 (stressing outside investment is necessary because firms often “lack flexibility
in funds that would otherwise allow them to innovate and invest in new recruits” or to enhance the
firm’s efficiency by investing in more technology, training, and knowledge management systems
(citations omitted)); see also ABA Comm’n on the Future of Legal Servs., Issues Paper Regarding Alternative
Business Structures, supra note 2 (reiterating ABS proponents’ contention that the traditional firm financial
structure hinders firms’ ability to enlarge “their scale and scope to engage in risky but potentially
lucrative business” (quoting LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, REGULATING THE EVOLVING LAW FIRM 9 (2008),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/regulation/lawfirm.authcheckdam.pd
f)).
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includes data from around a third of Solicitors with ABS status suggests this
ambition has been realized. In particular we find ABS Solicitors have higher
levels of innovative activity of all types than other Solicitors. This is consistent
with ABS Solicitors’ higher level of investment, staff engagement[,] and
external involvement in innovation. Our econometric analysis suggests that
ABS Solicitors are 12.9[–]14.8 percentage points more likely to introduce new
legal services, with potential benefits for service users. They are also more
likely to engage in strategic and organi[s]ational innovation.219

Moreover, data from research conducted in 2014 showed that nearly twothirds of ABSs were investing in technology.220 It is unclear how much
investment in technology was being made by traditional firms in 2014,
however, in a survey conducted in 2015, only 14.6% of traditional firms
provided clients with online interactive services beyond email, whereas
44.4% of ABSs did.221
4. Flexibility in Raising Capital
The issue of spurring innovation is closely related to the ability to raise
capital. Although most businesses have a variety of options to raise the
capital needed to operate, lawyers and law firms are not permitted to raise
capital outside of seeking bank loans and partnership buy-ins.222
Entrepreneurial lawyers with novel ideas for the delivery of legal services
have very few options to finance new ventures.223
Permitting ABSs would allow legal services providers to experiment with
the best model for delivery in a complex and rapidly changing market for
law.224 Options might include mergers of law firms, franchising options,
co-operatives, and partnerships with other professions, as well as offering

219. STEPHEN ROPER ET AL., ENTER. RESEARCH CTR., INNOVATION IN LEGAL SERVICES 71
(2015), https://www.sra.org.uk/documents/SRA/research/innovation-report.pdf (footnote omitted).
220. ABSs Leading the Way on Information Technology, CLC BLOG (Apr. 13, 2016),
http://www.conveyancer.org.uk/CLC-Blog/April-2016/ABSs-Leading-the-Way-on-InformationTechnology.aspx.
221. Id.
222. See ABA Comm’n on the Future of Legal Servs., Issues Paper Regarding Alternative Business
Structures, supra note 2 (“The traditional law firm relies on law partners and banks for funding . . . .”).
223. See id. (asserting the allowance of nonlawyer investment could enable a new attorney to
collaborate with skilled technology professionals to innovate novel methods of delivering legal
services).
224. See Groth, supra note 1, at 602 (advocating for one form of regulatory reform that would
integrate flexibility into the now-rigid American approach to multidisciplinary models, and contending
the ABA will be forced to consider the matter again due to the rapid changes occurring in today’s legal
market (citations omitted)).
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employee incentives.225
Firms could also benefit from passive investors who may provide capital
to the firm that otherwise would be very difficult to raise from capitalconstrained professionals within the firm or from banks because passive
investors may be willing to take more risks.226 This would be particularly
true where there are many equity-owners as they would be better able to
spread the risk amongst them.227
One testimonial of the importance of the availability of capital comes
from the United Kingdom chief executive of Slater & Gordon. He has
stated that being listed on the Australian Stock Exchange228 enabled the
firm to “invest in technology and innovation.”229 “The firm’s dramatic
growth, from 400 staff and 17 offices in 2007 to 4,600 staff and 86 offices
in 2016, would not have been achieved if [Slater & Gordon] had retained its
partnership structure and refused external funding . . . .”230 He went on to
note that the firm’s leadership board was chosen for its “managerial rather
than [their] legal skills and none of the non-executive directors [a]re
lawyers.”231
Furthermore, evidence from England shows that ABSs are far more likely
to invest in their businesses than non-ABSs. In an analysis of 218 regulatory
225. See Adams, supra note 6, at 790, 807 (expounding upon the ways incorporation and a capital
advantage open the door to possibilities that might otherwise be too risky, such as “large-scale
corporate law firm mergers,” issuing shares to lawyers yet to make partner to align their interest with
the firm’s interest, and poaching already successful partners at other firms).
226. See ABA Comm’n on the Future of Legal Servs., Issues Paper Regarding Alternative Business
Structures, supra note 2 (contrasting the ability to ascertain financial flexibility through ABSs to the
traditional financial model employed by firms, which depends upon funding from firm partners and
banks and hampers firms’ ability to engage in risky yet possibly lucrative businesses endeavors).
227. Cf. Adams, supra note 6, at 807 (reasoning large amounts of equity investment is a necessity
for firm expansion because it provides the firm with more flexibility to take on additional risk and
pursue potentially lucrative endeavors).
228. See id. at 802 (referring to the firm, which sought public capitalization and is currently “traded
on the Australian Stock Exchange,” as “the poster child of publicly-owned law firms” (citation
omitted)).
229. Nick Hilborne, Slater & Gordon Targets Improved Customer Experience, LEGALFUTURES (Nov. 10,
2016),
http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/slater-gordon-targets-improved-customerexperience.
230. Id.
231. Id. It should be noted that Slater & Gordon has had severe accounting and financial
problems. See generally Melissa Fyfe, The Undoing of Slater and Gordon, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD
(June 25, 2016, 12:15AM), http://www.smh.com.au/good-weekend/the-undoing-of-slater-andgordon-20160613-gphmej.html (expounding upon Slater & Gordon’s financial and accounting
downfalls, which was described as “one of the biggest falls from grace in Australian business history”
(citation omitted)). It is less than clear, however, whether—and to what extent—these problems are
related to its business structure. See id. (“There are several theories about why Slater & Gordon ended
up where it is today . . . .”).
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returns,232 completed in a yearly survey by the Council for Licensed
Conveyancers (CLC), over half of ABSs (52.2%) made sizable investments
in 2015, whereas slightly less than one-fourth (23.2%) of non-ABS bodies
did.233 It was also reported that non-ABS bodies were almost twice as likely
as ABSs to seriously consider making an investment and then decide not to
commit to the expenditure.234 While acknowledging “the caveat that
correlation does not equal causation, it nevertheless seems that there may
be something about the ABS[s] which engenders a greater sense of
entrepreneurialism.”235
5. Flexibility in Remunerating Employees
Research in the United Kingdom and in the field of organizational
behavior supports the conclusion that employee ownership can provide
significant benefits to the organization, including “increased productivity
and return on assets.”236 There are many aspects to managing a law
practice,237 and many lawyers have neither the skill nor the interest in some
of those areas.238 The organization would benefit from having a partner
who specializes in those areas, freeing up the lawyers to “practice at the top
of their licenses.”239
From the perspective of the nonlawyer with both skill and interest in
232. COUNCIL FOR LICENSED CONVEYANCERS, ANNUAL REGULATORY RETURN ANALYSIS
9 (2016), http://clc-uk.org/CLCSite/media/Research-Reports/CLC-ARR-2015-16-Report-(FINAL).
pdf.
233. Id. at 50. “The Council for Licensed Conveyancers (CLC) is a specialist property law
regulator. It has authority over the profession of licensed conveyancers, but it is primarily an entity
regulator. This means that it has a particular interest in the good management of the practices for
which it has regulatory responsibility.” Id. at 8.
234. See id. at 50 (reporting 4.3% of ABSs seriously considered an investment that they did not
make, while 8.3% of other recognized bodies considered the same).
235. Id.
236. See generally SNYDER, supra note 196, at 49–52 (discussing the benefits derived from
employee ownership (citations omitted)).
237. See Hadfield, supra note 203, at 52 (noting even in the context of a conventional law practice,
a successful and efficient office can only be supported by “expertise in finance, business management,
billing and collection, customer service,” and more).
238. Cf. id. at 53 (“Even if lawyers can learn enough office management expertise to handle a
small business . . . .”); McMorrow, supra note 158, at 672 (acknowledging “some lawyers have very poor
business acumen, such as lack of organization skills, poor systems of communication with clients, and
excessive caseloads”).
239. Cf. John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and the American Legal
Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in the Twenty-First Century,
69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 125 (2000) (analyzing how nonlawyer partners could provide firms with
enhanced management techniques (citations omitted)); Hadfield, supra note 203, at 53 (contending
lawyers’ time and effort is better spent being an attorney and innovating legal reasoning, than
attempting to innovate improvements in the nonlegal mechanisms for delivering legal services).

2017]

Alternative Business Structures

343

human resources, process management, efficiencies, or data collection, for
example, being able to become a partner in a venture is attractive.240 And
ownership in the work enterprise has been shown to improve employee
attitudes and commitment.241 In light of this data, the argument that a
salary (and perhaps a bonus) should be sufficient incentive for nonlawyers
to become employed by a law firm rings hollow.242 If this were an attractive
option to nonlawyers, a fortiori it should be an attractive option to lawyers.
Tell that to the lawyers elbowing their way to become equity partners at the
top of the pyramid.
B. What Is the Opposition to ABSs?
Critics of nonlawyer ownership argue that the stated benefits discussed
above will not be actualized.243 They argue that there should be data or
evidence that the benefits will actually accrue before the regulations should
be changed.244
In addition to arguing the proposed benefits are speculative, opponents
of ABSs assert allowing nonlawyer ownership or management will erode the
“core values” of the legal profession.245 These core values are reflected in
the fact that law is characterized as a profession—in juxtaposition to a
business.246 The values most often referred to are professional
240. See ABA Comm’n on the Future of Legal Servs., Issues Paper Regarding Alternative Business
Structures, supra note 2 (alleging ABSs could enable firms to employ stronger management teams more
because offering a share of ownership in the firm might make it easier to attract nonlawyer managers);
cf. Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 239, at 125 (stressing nonlawyer partners who offer firms
professional management techniques “will often be better than law partners at determining how the
firm may deliver quality legal and other professional services to the consumer in the most efficient
fashion and at the lowest possible costs” (citation omitted)).
241. See SNYDER, supra note 196, at 49–50 (referencing research that establishes the extensive
benefits an employer can derive from employee ownership, including “attracting and retaining good
employees” and increased employee job satisfaction, productivity, and “trust in the firm and its
management” (citations omitted)).
242. See id. (rejecting the argument due to its failure to consider research analyzing benefits
derived from employee ownership).
243. See, e.g., Perlman, supra note 33, at 78 (“[T]here was far less evidence supporting the idea that
ABSs would produce helpful transformative change than many proponents of ABSs have implied.”).
244. See generally id. at 76–79, 83 (exploring how regulatory reform attempts have failed due to the
lack of proof that ABSs would serve the public interest without eroding the profession’s core values).
245. See Thies, supra note 49, at 8 (expressing concern over an ABA proposal that would allow
“non[]lawyer ownership and control of law firms and the approval of fee splitting with non[]lawyers,
both in contravention of the core values of our profession”). The Indiana State Bar Association House
of Delegates, citing the ABA’s actions over the years, recently rejected the notion of ABSs after a
debate, citing fears that ABSs would compromise law firm’s independence and client loyalty. Id.
246. See Knake, supra note 61, at 42 (describing the “professional paradigm” as one that
differentiates lawyers from businesspersons because of the knowledge lawyers’ possess and because
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independence, confidentiality, and client loyalty.247
Professional
independence, the argument goes, will be undermined because lawyers
naturally will prioritize profits and the interest of their shareholders or
nonlawyer managers over their clients’ interests.248 In addition, critics
contend ABSs will also jeopardize confidentiality and loyalty by injecting
nonlawyers into the lawyer–client relationship.249 These arguments have
merit and should be addressed in any regulatory reform process.
1.

“Law Is a Profession, Not a Business.”

a. Profits Do Not Necessarily Undermine Professionalism.
The assertion that law is a profession and not a business and must remain
separate from the profit motive,250 is weak. Lawyers go into their careers
with the idea that they will be able to make a profit, or at least a decent
living.251 The American Lawyer’s annual report of profits per partner in
the largest of law firms252 belies the notion that there is no business concern
of making a profit. Moreover, certain aspects of business, such as efficiency,
quality customer service, and effectiveness absolutely should be reflected in
“lawyers altruistically place the good of their clients and the good of society above their own selfinterest” as opposed to businesspersons who focus on maximizing financial self-interest (quoting
Russell G. Pearce, The Professional Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct
and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1229, 1231 (1995))).
247. See Thies, supra note 49, at 8 (distinguishing lawyers from nonlawyers due to “core values
of loyalty to clients, competence in the law, confidentiality, avoidance of conflict of interest, and
independence from outside pressure that would influence our representation of clients”).
248. See Knake, supra note 61, at 14 (outlining opponents’ arguments against nonlawyer
ownership, one of which is lawyers will be subjected to “insurmountable conflicts of interests driven
by a profit motive instead of service to the client”); see also Adams, supra note 6, at 794–95 (reporting
opponents worry attorneys practicing in an MDP might succumb to business pressures and take
actions, such as settling a lawsuit, in an effort to please shareholders (citations omitted)).
249. See Groth, supra note 1, at 583 (announcing opponents’ main fear is transforming attorney–
client privilege and confidentiality into dead letters of the law if lawyers and nonlawyers are able to
practice together and freely share information (citing Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 239, at 174–
78)).
250. See Knake, supra note 61, at 42 (noting opponents distinguish between lawyers and
businesspeople and rely upon an “artificial notion of adhering to professionalism rather than the profitmotive”).
251. See id. at 14 (asserting the “professional/independence paradigm” fails to account for “the
economic realities of law practice” since the practice of law is in fact a business pressured by twentyfirst century realities like educational debt, overhead costs, competition, billing inefficiencies, and
technological innovation).
252. See David Lat, The 2016 Am Law 100: Trouble Ahead?, ABOVE L., http://abovethelaw.
com/2016/04/the-2016-am-law-100-trouble-ahead/ (last updated Apr. 27, 2016, 10:15 a.m.)
(exploring The American Lawyer’s findings, and expressing amazement over one firm’s “whopping
$6.6 million” profits per partner).
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how legal services are delivered.253
In fact, pressures to prioritize profits, even at a client’s expense, are
already pressed upon lawyers.254 On a contingency fee case, a lawyer “ha[s]
an incentive to settle a case before spending a substantial amount of money
on trial preparation, even if the client might recover more money by going
to trial.”255 Furthermore, when lawyers bill by the hour, they are
incentivized to “spend more time than is necessary to solve a client’s
problems.”256
Firms already require associates to meet billable hour targets that
emphasize maximizing profits257 and to drop clients who cannot afford to
pay.258 Further, lawyers can be beholden to third parties who pay clients’
fees, such as insurance companies,259 and usually have economic interests
that differ from those of the client.260
b. We Can and Do Regulate for Professionalism.
Safeguards inherent to a self-regulated profession will continue to uphold
the ideals of professionalism if and when Rule 5.4 and other Rules are
modified to allow ABS.261 First, the mandate of regulators to place the
253. See Groth, supra note 1, at 575–76 (highlighting the benefits business behaviors and
considerations could have for firms, and pointing out the value in “having a law firm that is run with
the efficiency, profit-cognizance, and long-term planning of a business” (citations omitted)).
254. Perlman, supra note 33, at 75.
255. Id. at 98 (citing GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
LAWYERING 799–800 (5th ed. 2010)).
256. Id. (first citing GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
LAWYERING 789–91 (5th ed. 2010); and then citing Douglas R. Richmond, For a Few Dollars More: The
Perplexing Problems of Unethical Billing Practices by Lawyers, 60 S.C. L. REV. 63 (2008)).
257. See The Truth About the Billable Hour, YALE L. SCH., https://law.yale.edu/student-life/careerdevelopment/students/career-guides-advice/truth-about-billable-hour (last visited May 14, 2017)
(warning the billable hour is a nearly unavoidable aspect of working for a firm, and explaining in order
for an attorney to be an asset to their firm, they must bill enough hours to generate firm revenue while
still covering their own overhead and salary).
258. Cf. Heather Gray-Grant, Why It’s Good Business to Fire a Client, SLAW (Jan. 24, 2017),
http://www.slaw.ca/2017/01/24/why-its-good-business-to-fire-a-client/ (adopting the view that
firing a “bad client” can be good for business because an unpaid hour is valueless).
259. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 239, at 197 (admitting a lawyer’s independent
professional judgment can be impaired in situations aside from MDPs, such as where the lawyer’s fee
for legal services provided to an individual is paid for by an organization (citation omitted)).
260. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2012) (“A lawyer’s
legal skill and training, together with the relationship of trust and confidence between lawyer and client,
create the possibility of overreaching when the lawyer participates in a business, property[,] or financial
transaction with a client . . . .”).
261. See Knake, supra note 61, at 6 (advancing the notion that the ethical standards would
continue to fortify independent professional judgment even if corporations could own or invest in a
law practice).

346

ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS

[Vol. 7:304

public interest above the interests of the bar creates a safeguard against the
erosion of professionalism.262 Second, individual members of the
profession generally have a strong desire to preserve both their individual
reputations and that of the profession at large.263 As an exclusive group of
people trained in specialized knowledge and skill, lawyers recognize each
other as an elite group of peers, in part by virtue of their common ethical
obligations.264
Many acknowledge that risks to professionalism and independence and
risks of legal services becoming increasingly institutionalized are equally
present under the current regulatory scheme. Professor Renee Newman
Knake captures this reality:
The economic realities of twenty-first century law practice pose a host of
challenges to lawyer independence, ranging from the pressure of massive
educational debt held by many recent law graduates to the mounting
inefficiency of the billable hour. Indeed, external investment may be the very
thing that preserves lawyer independence—especially given the burdens of
law school debt, billing inefficiencies, and leveraging of overhead costs—
thereby allowing for meaningful pro bono representation because the lawyer
no longer needs to worry about maintaining a case-by-case cash flow.265

Notably, the regulatory reforms in England and Australia contain several
examples of provisions to protect the “core values of the profession.”266
Attorney–client privilege, for example, is protected by rules requiring: a) the
entity to comply with the ethical obligations of lawyers;267 and b) the
262. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 12 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2012).
263. See Adams, supra note 6, at 794–95 (relaying opponents’ concern about the legal profession’s
reputation if passive investment is permitted); Groth, supra note 1, at 583 (considering opponents’ fear
that lawyer-nonlawyer partnerships will tarnish the legal profession’s image (citations omitted)).
264. See Russell G. Pearce, The Professional Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will
Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1229, 1231 (1995) (distinguishing
businesspersons, who prioritize financial self-interest, from lawyers, who “altruistically place the good
of their clients and the good of society above their own self-interest” and who possess wisdom
inaccessible to lay persons).
265. Knake, supra note 61, at 43–44.
266. See McMorrow, supra note 158, at 668 (emphasizing the regulations governing United
Kingdom ABSs safeguard adherence to professional obligations (citing Responsibilities of COLPs and
COFAs, SOLIC. REG. AUTHORITY, http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/colp-cofa/responsibilitiesrecord-report.page (last updated Sept. 10, 2014))).
267. Cf. Legal Services Act 2007, c. 29, § 190 (Eng. & Wales) (binding individuals acting at the
direction and supervision of a relevant lawyer with the legal professional privilege). In England and
Wales, under section 190 of the Legal Services Act 2007, privilege applies to communications made by
an ABS, provided that the communications are made through, or under the supervision of, a relevant
lawyer. Id. § 190(2)–(4).
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naming of a lawyer-director to assume responsibility for that compliance
with the ethical obligations.268 The legislation pioneered in New South
Wales (currently in effect in most Australian states other than New South
Wales and Victoria)269 includes a provision that makes it very clear that a
lawyer’s duties to the client, to the court, and to conduct oneself in a manner
that upholds the rule of law and administration of justice under the LPA,
supersedes the ABSs’ duties to shareholders.270 Australia’s publicly listed
legal practices have stated in their “prospectus[es], constituent documents[,]
and shareholder agreements” that their primary duty is to the court; their
secondary duty is to the client; their tertiary duty is to the shareholder; and
that where there is a clash between legal profession regulation and the
Corporations Act 2001, the former will prevail.271
Similarly, in Washington State, attorney–client privilege has been
extended to apply to LLLTs.272 The Supreme Court of Washington
authorizes LLLTs to render limited legal assistance or advice in approved
areas of law under ethical rules akin to those applicable to lawyers.273
2. “ABSs Will Undermine Lawyers’ Independent Judgment and Client
Loyalty.”
a. Exercising Independent Judgment Does Not Necessarily
Require Separation from Other Professionals.
It is important to recognize that our current ethical rules do not require
lawyers to deliver their legal advice in a vacuum. In fact, a comment to
Model Rule 2.1 recognizes that the practice of law is not only about law and
that “narrow” or “[p]urely technical legal advice” usually does not

268. Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT) s 107 (Austl.).
269. See A New Framework for Practising Law in NSW, supra note 137 (discussing the discrepancies
that exist amongst Australian jurisdictions and New South Wale’s and Victoria’s adoption of the LPUL
in 2014).
270. See Legal Profession Amendment (Incorporated Legal Practices) Act 2000 No 73 sch 1 s 47H (Austl.)
(detailing the “professional obligations [include] . . . .duties to the court, . . . obligations in connection
with conflicts of interest, . . . duties of disclosure to clients, . . . [and] ethical rules required to be
observed by a solicitor”).
271. Steve Mark, Views from an Australian Regulator, 2009 J. PROF. LAW. 45, 55 (2009) (citation
omitted).
272. WASH. ADMISSION AND PRACTICE RULES r. 28(K)(3) (2016).
273. Id. r. 28(K). Rule 28 prescribes the limitations on the provision of services by LLTs and
includes subrule (K)(3) as follows: “The Washington law of attorney-client privilege and law of a
lawyer’s fiduciary responsibility to the client shall apply to the Limited License Legal Technician-client
relationship to the same extent as it would apply to an attorney-client relationship.” Id. r. 28(K)(3).
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adequately serve the client.274 Another comment recognizes the value of
association with other professionals to enhance the quality of services a
lawyer provides.275
Critics argue that nonlawyer shareholders or partners might undermine
independence by, for example, forcing lawyers to disclose confidential client
information,276 encouraging lawyers to cut corners,277 and accepting only
the most profitable clients while dropping the others.278 However, the
current regulatory reality does not require lawyers to operate in a way that
maximizes the principles of independence and client interest.279
Moreover, an individual is not ethical or unethical based merely on their
education or licensure.280 To argue that mixing with nonlawyers at work
will make lawyers abandon their ethical obligations is insulting to both
lawyers and other professionals. It should not be assumed that nonlawyer
businesspeople would always act only to pursue profits, regardless of ethics

274. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2012) (indicating
moral and ethical considerations may be properly referred to in rendering advice).
275. See id. r. 2.1 cmt. 4 (stating attorney’s advice may include a referral to a professional outside
the domain of legal work).
276. See ABA Comm’n on the Future of Legal Servs., Issues Paper Regarding Alternative Business
Structures, supra note 2 (“If nonlawyer partners are privy to privileged conversations between attorneys
and clients, court might refuse to uphold the attorney[–]client privilege.”).
277. See Knake, supra note 61, at 42–43 (2012) (rooting the abhorrence for business conduct in
the vilification of profit maximizers who would be tempted “to cut ethical corners in search of a buck”
due to their competition with other lawyers in marketing legal services (quoting Pearce, supra note 264,
at 1242–43)).
278. See ABA Comm’n on the Future of Legal Servs., Issues Paper Regarding Alternative Business
Structures, supra note 2 (extending opponents’ concerns to fears that less pro bono work will be
performed and access to justice for low- and middle-income individuals will not be improved because
nonlawyer ownership will primarily occur in areas with potentially high return rates and such ownership
will lead lawyers’ to prioritize maximizing return on nonlawyers’ investments).
279. See Perlman, supra note 33, at 98 (“[L]awyers already have an incentive to prioritize profits
over client needs.”).
280. See Groth, supra note 1, at 575–76 (refuting the opponents’ argument that professional
ethical standards can only be maintain by way of lawyers’ monopoly on the legal service sector as
presumptuous, and pointing out the desire to make a profit does not necessarily implicate a unethical
propensities or deficient services). As one author has argued:
Nonlawyers can and do recognize the ethical rules and requirements of the legal profession.
Indeed, many nonlawyers are required to follow and uphold state ethical standards and
professional codes of conduct for their own business professions. Many nonlawyers such as
accountants and engineers have their own professionalism statutes or rules of ethics, additional
training requirements, and examination requirements. Thus, suggesting that nonlawyers, simply
by virtue of being nonlawyers, cannot separate morality from money is inapposite.
Id. at 576 (footnotes omitted).
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and morality, any more than lawyers will.281 And it should not be assumed
that the ethical backbone of lawyers is so weak as to turn to jelly due to
working alongside nonlawyers.
Significantly, the argument that association with nonlegal professionals
will dilute professional independence and client loyalty is arguably only
voiced by lawyers.282 Arguably, clients and members of the public have not
been asked their opinion. It is not clear whether members of the public are
aware of the ethical rules applicable to lawyers’ business structures or that
there is a proscription against going into business with nonlawyers.
Furthermore, it is not at all clear they are concerned about their lawyers
possibly forming a joint venture with other professionals.
Notably, Responsive Law, an organization “representing the interests of
individuals in the legal system,”283 has commented numerous times to the
ABA and other regulatory authorities in favor of ABSs.284 In one of those
comments, the desires of consumers was explicitly emphasized: “[W]e can
confirm that consumers nationwide would welcome the lower prices and
new combinations of services that true innovation in the delivery of legal
services would bring.”285
Furthermore, Responsive Law argued
multidisciplinary practices should be allowed because “partnerships between
social workers and family lawyers or between financial advisors and tax
lawyers could create new service models benefiting the large majority of the
public that currently has limited access to the legal system.”286
Crucially, data from both England and Australia shows that allowing
ABSs for lawyers has not undermined the core values of the legal profession.
In Australia, the disciplinary complaints against lawyers have remained static
or dropped significantly in the years since the ethical infrastructure to ABSs
was put in place.287 Similarly, in England, the Legal Consumer Panel noted
281. See McMorrow, supra note 158, at 674 (criticizing the argument due to its underlying
presumption that nonlawyers behave immorally).
282. Compare id. at 670 (“Scholars have been much more receptive and supportive of non[]lawyer
owners and investors than the U.S. practicing bar.” (citations omitted)), with Adams, supra note 6,
at 794–95 (identifying “professionals” and “practitioners” as ABS opponents), and Perlman, supra
note 33, at 82 (opining that “the legal profession’s resistance to ABSs will eventually wane”).
283. RESPONSIVE L., http://www.responsivelaw.org (last visited May 14, 2017).
284. Tom Gordon, Disappointing ABA Commission Identifies What’s Wrong with Regulation of Lawyers
But Fails to Act, RESPONSIVE L. (Aug. 05, 2006), http://www.responsivelaw.org/index.php/
blog/item/141-disappointing-aba-commission-identifies-what-s-wrong-with-regulation-of-lawyersbut-fails-to-act?highlight=WyJhYnMiXQ==.
285. Memorandum from Thomas M. Gordon, Legal & Policy Dir., Consumers for a Responsive
Legal Sys., to ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20 (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.responsivelaw.org/files/
responsive%20law%20comments%20on%20alps.pdf.
286. Id.
287. Gordon & Mark, supra note 125, at 192.
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that there were “no major disciplinary failings . . . or unusual levels of
complaints” in the data collected since ABSs have been allowed.288 In fact,
the Panel concluded “the dire predictions about a collapse in ethics and
reduction in access to justice as a result of ABS[s] have not materialised.”289
3. Core Values of the Profession Include Duties to the Legal System
and for the Quality of Justice.
The Preamble to the Model Rules makes clear there are core values of the
legal profession that extend beyond the attorney–client relationship. In
addition to duties owed to their clients, lawyers also have a set of
responsibilities as “officer[s] of the legal system” and, separately, as public
citizens with a “special responsibility for the quality of justice.”290 Lawyers
fail to live up to the full complement of the core values of their chosen
profession by focusing only on the duties owed to their (ever-shrinking)
client base to the exclusion of the other two categories of responsibilities.
A lawyer’s representation of her client must be tempered by the obligation
to uphold the integrity of the administration of justice.291 As an officer of
the legal system, for example, Model Rule 3.3 requires a lawyer to exercise
her duty of candor to a tribunal and not allow a court to be misled by false
statements of law or fact.292 We cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that
increasingly, members of the public believe the administration of justice is
not applicable to them.293
Importantly, the Preamble exhorts a lawyer to “seek improvement of the
law, access to the legal system, the administration of justice[,] and the quality
of service rendered by the legal profession.”294 These are important core
values that set lawyers apart from other individuals who may be providing
legal products or services. It is unacceptable for lawyers to fail to facilitate
the public’s “access to the legal system” or to seek to improve the
administration of justice and “the quality of service rendered by the legal
profession.”295

288. LEGAL SERVS. CONSUMER PANEL, supra note 215, at 15.
289. Id.
290. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2012).
291. See id. r. 8.4(d) (defining professional misconduct to include “conduct that is prejudicial to
the administration of justice”).
292. Id. r. 3.3.
293. See id. pmbl. para. 6 (requiring lawyers to “seek improvement of the law, access to the legal
system, the administration of justice[,] the quality of service rendered by the legal profession”).
294. Id.
295. Id.
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VI. TEMPLATE FOR STATE ADOPTION OF ABSS
This Article has laid out several arguments for allowing ABSs in the
United States. First, the public interest currently is not being adequately
served by the legal profession.296 Second, lawyers currently are not
financially able to provide less expensive or more pro bono services
sufficient to adequately serve the public.297 Third, other countries have
modified attorney regulation with resulting increased service and
satisfaction—by both customers and lawyers.298 In light of these factors,
attorney regulations in the United States should be re-examined and reformulated to better effectuate their purpose of serving the public interest.
Given those arguments, this Article will now propose some suggested
steps to ethically and professionally change the regulation paradigm. These
steps draw on lessons learned from the experiences of other countries, the
rationale of the ethical rules, and the need for data-driven decisions. They
also are offered in the context of the understanding that no one action is
likely to be a panacea for the problems plaguing both the public who lack
access to legal services and the lawyers who are charged to serve the public.
A.

Baseline surveys of the public and the profession should be
conducted to determine the level of satisfaction and the pain
points of each. (Many states already have comprehensive access
to justice surveys and reports.)

B.

Establish a process for approving ABSs that includes:
1) Proactive regulation and entity registration or both. If entity
regulation is pursued, designate one or more individuals in each
entity who will be responsible for the ethical infrastructure.
(Some states, such as Colorado, Illinois, and New Mexico, have
started down this path by exploring the concept of proactive
attorney regulation.)299
2) Rules for the acceptable ethical infrastructure required of ABSs

296. See discussion supra Section III.A.
297. See discussion supra Section III.B.
298. See discussion supra Section III.C.
299. Interview with William D. Slease, Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Disciplinary Bd. of the N.M.
Supreme Court (Dec. 13, 2016); see also SNYDER, supra note 196, at 15–16 (discussing the activity taking
place in Colorado and Illinois). Recently, Illinois took the spotlight as the first state “to adopt Proactive
Management Based Regulation.” Press Release, Supreme Court of Ill., Illinois Becomes First State
to Adopt Proactive Management Based Regulation (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/
Media/PressRel/2017/012417.pdf.
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that include protection of client confidentiality and
independent professional judgment of lawyers.
C.

To monitor the efficacy of ABSs, the regulatory reform should
establish a procedure that includes:
1) Periodic audits of process and recordkeeping as to ensure
compliance with the ethical infrastructure;
2) Reporting as to innovative techniques utilized by both ABSs
and non-ABS legal structures;
3) Reporting as to passive investors and capital infusions; and
4) Client complaints and satisfaction of both ABS and non-ABS
clients.

D.

Modify Rule 5.4. For examples, the District of Columbia’s rule,
the Washington State rules, and prior drafts of Rule 5.4 of the
Kutak Commission should be consulted. In addition, Rules 5.5
and 1.5 should be modified, as well as any other rules as necessary
to bring harmony to the regulatory framework. As a touchstone,
the ABA Model Regulatory Objectives can be used.

E.

Implement the reformed regulatory framework. The legal
community should wait and see the results and be willing to
change regulations, as necessary and appropriate, to promote the
interests of the public.

VII. CONCLUSION
The evidence shows the legal system in the United States is not serving
the public or the lawyers well. Evidence further shows that in Australia and
England, as well as some parts of Canada, ABSs are providing better service
to the public without a negative impact on the core values of the profession.
History suggests that the ABA is not likely to soon amend the Model Rules
to allow ABSs in the United States.300
The ABA House of Delegates and some state and local bar associations
that have considered the issue have called for evidence that ABSs will
provide benefits and not harm.301 Given the fact that the only data being
300. See generally Perlman, supra note 33, at 75–83 (“History offers a useful guide as to why the
ABA House of Delegates was highly likely to reject any changes proposed by the Commission in th[e
ABS] area.”).
301. See McMorrow, supra note 158, at 675 (indicating opponents’ are concerned about whether
the benefits of ABSs will accrue and their call for proof professional judgment will not be harmed).
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gathered is in other countries, with regulatory schemes that are
distinguishable from those in the United States,302 one wonders what
evidence will ever be sufficient.
While lawyers fail to address this issue, all the while claiming to have the
interests of clients and the public at heart, the legal profession is failing to
adequately serve the public. And those without law degrees and
unhampered by regulation are filling that void. We should not be satisfied
with the status quo.
As aptly articulated in the Preamble to the Model Rules, “[t]he profession
has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public
interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of
the bar.”303 A state supreme court should revamp their regulations to better
serve the public interest, garnering data each step of the way. The others
will follow.

302. For a discussion regarding the divergent reform pressures in the United States and the
United Kingdom, see id. at 675–80.
303. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 12 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).

